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I Introduction
Over the past decade, I have taken a number of western vacations. Each
time, I have attended a rodeo. From these experiences, I have gained an
abiding respect for the bravery of rodeo cowboys and have become certain
that they lack any judgment, as they frequently risk life and limb for paltry
prize purses. I have learned of the cowboy culture's view of politics from the
fans around me and the off-color "humor" of the rodeo clowns who fill time
between events. I have reached two conclusions about these cowboys and the
culture they reflect. First, Bill Clinton is widely detested. Second, these
cowboys do not give a damn what may get broken as they careen about the
arena attempting to better a beast. These characteristics seem important for
understanding the Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) in litigating United
States v. Hubbell' as well. The OIC's recklessness severely impaired the
value of use immunity applied to subpoenas for documents from the perspec-
tive of prosecutors. The OIC's crude overreaching was fortuitous because it
exposed the dangerous implications of allowing prosecutors to subpoena
incriminating evidence from targets and then use that evidence to convict, and
it prompted a strong corrective response from the Court.2
1. 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
2. See United States V. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037,2047 (2000) (expressing "no doubt"
that Fifth Amendment protects against compelled disclosure of "existence of sources of poten-
tially incriminating evidence").
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The Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment document-production and use
immunity decisions have been complicated and occasionally sweeping in their
pronouncements.3 However, due perhaps to the doctrinal complexity, cases
repeatedly have included statements that categorical answers are inappropri-
ate.4 The most prominent features of the opinions in this area have been their
cautious step-by-step approach and their obvious solicitousness to the interest
of the government in maintaining the usefulness of grand jury subpoenas for
documents, even those obtained from potential targets of prosecution.5 More-
over, while legal rules are often complicated, the application of the Fifth
Amendment and use immunity to the act of producing documents subpoenaed
by a grand jury is particularly esoteric.6 This was not the place for prosecu-
tors recklessly to disregard the Court's cautiously favorable disposition to
their position and to ignore the intricate, and therefore likely fragile, character
of the doctrine.
Acting directly against Webster Hubbell, but no doubt in actual pursuit
of William Jefferson and Hillary Rodham Clinton, the prosecutors in the OIC
entered this arena. Their arrival was something akin to rodeo cowboys riding
a bucking bronco or an enraged bull through a china shop. Things did get
broken. Although the exact consequences of such blunt and overwhelming
force are not yet clear, the relevant doctrines have been altered significantly,
and the potential for prosecutorial excesses curtailed. Granting use immunity
3. See Brasswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-17 (1988) (ruling that compelling
custodian of corporate records to produce organization's records does not violate Fifth Amend-
ment and therefore, immunity not required despite corporation's small size and incriminating
nature of records).
4. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (discussing testimonial and
incriminating aspects of production and noting that "[t]hese questions perhaps do not lend them-
selves to categorical answers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and circumstances
of particular cases or classes thereof"); see also Brasswell, 487 U.S. at 103 (quoting Fisher on
this point); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984) [hereinafter Doe 1] (same).
5. See, e.g.,Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 (limiting scope of privilege by stating that "[w]e
note further that recognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the records custodians
of collective entities would have a detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute
'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement authori-
ties"); Doe I, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17 (rejecting defendant's argument that grant of use immunity
must cover contents of business records as well as act of production on basis that immunity need
only protect defendant from self-incrimination that might "accompany" production).
6. See generally Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,Documents and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimi-
nation, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27 (1986); Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege andDocu-
ments - Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REv. 439 (1984); Kenneth J. Melii, Act-of-
Production Immunity, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 223 (1991); Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena
Law: Taking the Ffth AmendmentSeriously, 73 VA. L. REv. 1 (1987); Richard A. Nagareda,
Compulsion "to Be a Witness" and the Resurrection ofBoyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575 (1999);
William J. StuntzSelf-Incriminaion andExcuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1988).
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entails great risks, and prosecutors are now generally in a much weaker
position than before OIC cowboys' wild ride.
This Article deals with an application of the Fifth Amendment that is
important to prosecutors in the modem world where crimes are committed
with both documents and weapons. I believe this area of the law should be
treated as an actual part of the Fifth Amendment rather than as a technical
aside. However, I do not dwell on the philosophical basis of the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. I have no doubts that the privilege can
be defended. I believe the privilege against self-incrimination is a central part
of our criminal justice system and basic traditions, regardless of whether the
underlying purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is to prevent
overreaching by the state, to create a fair balance between the state and the
individual, or to protect a critical aspect of human dignity.!
One reason I do not discuss these theoretical issues is that I do not find
them determinative of whether the Hubbell case was rightly decided or how
the Fifth Amendment doctrine should apply to the act of production and use
immunity. Under any acceptable theory, the prosecution's actions in Hubbell
were constitutionally unacceptable, and the difficult remaining questions are
unresolved regardless of the theory chosen. I also do not pursue the historical
and linguistic analysis of Justices Thomas and Scalia.' Such analysis is ob-
viously an important component of constitutional interpretation, and it occa-
sionally resolves issues.' However, its application usually is ambiguous and
provides an incomplete answer to complex questions."
7. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (reciting justifica-
tions for privilege against self-incrimination). I accept as a plausible argument, but am not yet
persuaded that the privilege encourages accuracy in fact-finding by requiring the government
to establish its case independently. See id. (stating that privilege against self-incrimination
requires government to bear entire burden of proof); cf Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,
540-41 (1961) (explaining that involuntary convictions are not excluded because of likelihood
that they are untrue, but because procedures are offensive to our basic values).
8. See United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2050 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that, according to usage of term "witness" at time amendment was adopted, Fifth
Amendment's use of "witness" may have been intended to protect against compelled testimony
and compelled evidence); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(suggesting that similar analysis supported different understanding of term "witness against
him" in Confrontation Clause of Sixth Amendment).
9. I do not denigrate the historical analysis ofthe meaning of language inthe Constitution,
such as was done by Professor Nagareda regarding the meaning of"to be a witness" in the Fifth
Amendment. See generally Nagareda, supra note 6 (analyzing Fifth Amendment). Indeed, I
have attempted a similar task regarding the meaning of "witnesses against him" in the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and
Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 ILL. L. REV.
691,748-49. Rather, my position is that these types of analyses rarely are clear or dispositive.
10. Moreover, such an analysis has a predictable restrictive impact on rights, which were
few and far between at the time of the framing by modem standards. See e.g., Massiah v.
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My analysis, instead, is founded on a combination oftraditional doctrinal
analysis, some pragmatism and prudential "balancing,"'" and a basic devotion
to an intuitive sense of what I believe the core meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment is and should be in American legal and political culture. That core
meaning revolves around a commitment against an inquisitorial model of
prosecution that can demand communications from the target of potential
criminal charges - communications upon which the prosecution will build its
case.' 2 This model of prosecution is out of kilter with our basic values.
The major subject of this Article is the reshaped act of production
doctrine. This Article focuses particularly on the fearsome consequences of
prosecution granting use immunity to a potential target of an investigation
after Hubbell. Fatal consequences to future prosecutorial use of an item of
evidence may flow anytime a subpoena requires the target to employ truth-
telling in producing the item. This is a very broad formulation of when the
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (developing right of counsel at critical stages of proceedings
to protect against questioning by law enforcement agents, which was devoid of historical ante-
cedents at time of Sixth Amendment's framing). Reliance upon this method of constitutional
interpretation may reveal as much about the politics of those who build their jurisprudence upon
it as it does about its interpretive merits.
11. Although the Court only occasionally explicitly acknowledges that it is engaging in
the balancing of rights and interests, see, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,427 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (balancing public need against individual's claim to constitutional protec-
tion under Fourth Amendment), and while the results of that process certainly are not always
clearly defensible, see id. (holding that statute requiring driver involved in accident to stop and
provide identification does not violate Fifth Amendment), such balancing is and realistically
must be a part of the development of constitutional rights. See 3 WAYiM R. LAFAVE ET AL,
CRDMALPROCEDLuRE § 8.12(c), at 244 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that although not articulated as
such by Court, similar balancing is presumably at core of Fifth Amendment required records
doctrine).
12. In condemning coerced confessions, Justice Frankfurter stated, "[O]urs is an accusa-
torial and not an inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish guilt by evi-
dence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an
accused out of his own mouth." Richmond, 365 U.S. at 541. Similarly, in Wattsv. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949), he observed:
Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system. Such has been the
characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it freed itself from practices
borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby an accused was interro-
gated in secret for hours on end. Under our system society carries the burden of
proving its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish
its case, not by interrogation of the accused even under judicial safeguards, but by
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.
Id. at 54 (citation omitted). The methods used by the prosecution in Hubbell admittedly were
unlike those employed to coerce a confession, and a basic issue in the case was whether any
communication at all was required from him. However, I believe, and the Court concluded, that
a fair analysis of the OIC's actions were squarely within the types of practices condemned by
Frankfurter as contrary to our system's fundamental character.
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Fifth Amendment is triggered. The subplot of this Article, developed in Part
II, examines OIC's recklessness in its myopic pursuit of the President and
First Lady and the negative impact on long-term prosecutorial interests. 3 It
is but a small addition to the volumes that have been written about the serious
flaws in the structure of the OIC.14 This particular installment suggests the
pernicious consequences of separating prosecutors from broad institutional
objective of doing public justice in a wide range of cases.
This Article then turns to Hubbell's impact on the act of production doc-
trine and the prosecution's ability to use evidence after granting the target
immunity. Part III briefly reviews the basic elements of the complicated act
of production and use immunity doctrines." Part IV considers the immediate
impact of the Hubbell decision, which holds that when the prosecution does
not have specific information about the existence of incriminating documents,
demanding them violates the Fifth Amendment, and granting use immunity
places the contents of those documents off limits to the prosecution. 6 Part V
analyzes Hubbell's potential to narrow the usefilness of subpoenas directed
to targets, even when the prosecution can prove that the requested items exist
and have been in the target's possession." The highlight here is an illuminat-
ing set ofhypotheticals that were posed during the Hubbell litigation." These
hypotheticals made it impossible to ignore the troubling implications of
approving the prosecution's position. Two issues remain unresolved:
(1) whether lack of knowledge of the immediate location of the subpoenaed
items will carry the same consequences as lack of knowledge of their exis-
tence; and (2) how directly incriminating possession of the item must be when
established through the act of production. This Article concludes by setting
out, in Part VI, how the Hubbell case may have completely reformulated the
13. See infra Part IU (examining negative impact on long-term prosecutorial interests
created by OIC).
14. See, e.g., William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation Under the
Independent CounselSystem, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1197,1199 (1999) (faulting statute for dividing
executive authority and responsibility to prosecute crime); Christopher H. Schroeder, Putting
Law and Politics in the Right Places- Reforming the Independent Counsel Statute, 62 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PRoBs.,Winter 1999, at 163,176 (noting that, by virtue ofstatute's requirements and
other factors, such as lack of budgetary restraint, OIC prosecutions tend to lack proportionality
and involve over-investigation).
15. See infra Part IIl (analyzing basic componenets of act of production doctrine).
16. See infra Part IV (considering Hubbell's immediate impact on limiting prosecution's
use of subpoenaed documents acquired by granting use immunity).
17. See infra Part V (examining potential limits to usefulness of subpoenas directed to
targets).
18. See infra Part V.B.1 (examining hypotheticals posed, inter alia, in court of appeals
opinion and Supreme Court argument).
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law of subpoenaing and using items from targets." For individual defendants,
such a result may be lawful only when the government has precise information
on both the existence and the immediate location of the item. Prosecutors,
very frequently, will lack this information.
ff. The Cowboys'Reckless Ride
In August 1994, the original grant of authority was given to the OIC to
investigate James McDougal, President Bill Clinton, and First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton in connection with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan and
the White Water Development Corporation." In September 1994, the OIC
began its formal pursuit of Webster Hubbell, former law partner of the First
Lady. The OIC requested referral of Hubbell, who was covered by 28 U.S.C.
§ 591(b), 21 for mail fraud and tax evasion charges while he was a member of
the Rose Law Firm where he and Mrs. Clinton had practiced law.' The
Independent Counsel brought charges against Hubbell later that year, and in
December 1994, Hubbell pled guilty to felony charges of mail fraud and tax
evasion.' He was sentenced to prison for twenty-one months and was incar-
cerated from August 1995 until February 1997.24
While Hubbell was in prison, the OIC again applied prosecutorial pres-
sure. On November 1, 1996, it served him with a subpoena commanding "the
production of all his business, financial, and tax records from January 1, 1993
to the date of the subpoena."' The OIC's ultimate goal was to uncover evi-
19. See infra Part VI (concluding that Hubbell may have completely altered current law
of subpoenaing).
20. United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25,27 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd, vacated by 167
F.3d 552 (1999), affid, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1994) (designating individuals subject to statute).
22. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 33. The subpoena commanded Hubbell to appear and testify before the grand
jury of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on November 19,
1996, and to bring with him the following documents:
A. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to any direct or indirect
sources of money or other things of value received by or provided to Webster
Hubbell, his wife, or children from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not
limited to the identity of employers or clients of legal or any other type of work.
B. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to any direct or indirect
sources of money or other things of value received by or provided to Webster
Hubbell, his wife, or children from January 1,1993 to the present, including but not
limited to billing memoranda, draft statements, bills, final statements, and/or bills
for work performed or time billed from January 1,1993 to the present.
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C. Copies of all bank records of Webster Hubbell, his wife, or children for all
accounts from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not limited to all state-
ments, registers and ledgers, cancelled checks, deposit items, and wire transfers.
D. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to time worked or billed
by Webster Hubbell from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not limited
to original time sheets, books, notes, papers, and/or computer records.
E. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to expenses incurred by
and/or disbursements of money by Webster Hubbell during the course of any work
performed or to be performed by Mr. Hubbell from January 1, 1993 to the present.
F. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to Webster Hubbell's
schedule of activities, including but not limited to any and all calendars, day-timers,
time books, appointment books, diaries, records of reverse telephone toll calls,
credit card calls, telephone message slips, logs, other telephone records, minutes,
databases, electronic mail messages, travel records, itineraries, tickets for transpor-
tation of any kind, payments, bills, expense backup documentation, schedules,
and/or any other document or database that would disclose Webster Hubbell's
activities from January 1, 1993 to the present.
G. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to any retainer agree-
ments or contracts for employment of Webster Hubbell, his wife, or his children
from January 1, 1993 to the present.
H. Any and all tax returns and tax return information, including but not limited to
all W-2s, form 1099s, schedules, draft returns, work papers, and backup documents
filed, created or held by or on behalf of Webster Hubbell, his wife, his children,
and/or any business in which he, his wife, or his children holds or has held an inter-
est, for the tax years 1993 to the present.
L Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to work performed or to
be performed or on behalf of the City of Los Angeles, California, the Los Angeles
Department of Airports or any other Los Angeles municipal Governmental entity,
Mary Leslie, and/or Alan S. Arkatov, including but not limited to correspondence,
retainer agreements, contracts, time sheets, appointment calendars, activity calen-
dars, diaries, billing statements, billing memoranda, telephone records, telephone
message slips, telephone credit card statements, itineraries, tickets for transporta-
tion, payment records, expense receipts, ledgers, check registers, notes, memoranda,
electronic mail, bank deposit items, cashier's checks, traveler's checks, wire transfer
records and/or other records of financial transactions.
J. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to work performed or to
be performed by Webster Hubbell, his wife, or his children on the recommendation,
counsel or other influence of Mary Leslie and/or Alan S. Arkatov, including but not
limited to correspondence, retainer agreements, contracts, time sheets, appointment
calendars, activity calendars, diaries, billing statements, billing memoranda, tele-
phone records, telephone message slips, telephone credit card statements, itinerar-
ies, tickets for transportation, payment records, expense receipts, ledgers, check
registers, notes, memoranda, electronic mail, bank deposit items, cashier's checks,
traveler's checks, wire transfer records and/or other records of financial transac-
tions.
K. Any and all documents related to work performed or to be performed for or on
behalf of Lippo Ltd. (formerly Public Finance (H.K.) Ltd.), the Lippo Group, the
Lippo Bank, Mochtar Riady, James Riady, Stephen Riady, John Luen Wai Lee,
John Huang, Mark W. Grobmyer, C. Joseph Giroir, Jr., or any affiliate, subsidiary,
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dence of obstruction ofjustice,26 and it is unlikely that Hubbell was the real
target.
27
Before Hubbell's appearance at the grand jury, his attorney, John Nields,
talked and exchanged letters with the OIC about Hubbell's assertion of the
Fifth Amendment with respect to production of the documents.' They also
discussed the consequences of the OIC granting use immunity to overcome
Hubbell's privilege claim." Nields made a broad claim regarding the effect
of granting use immunity, contending that it would "operate so as to prevent
any evidentiary use of the documents against" his client.3" The OIC disagreed,
asserting instead that use immunity would only bar "introducing the act of
or corporation owned or controlled by or related to the aforementioned entities or
individuals, including but not limited to correspondence, retainer agreements, con-
tracts, time sheets, appointment calendars, activity calendars, diaries, billing state-
ments, billing memoranda, telephone records, telephone message slips, telephone
credit card statements, itineraries, tickets for transportation, payment records, ex-
pense receipts, ledgers, check registers, notes, memoranda, electronic mail, bank
deposit items, cashier's checks, traveler's checks, wire transfer records and/or other
records of financial transactions.
United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037,2048-49 (2000).
26. United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25,28 (D.D.C. 1998),rev'd, vacated by 167
F.3d 552 (1999), affj'd, 129 S. Ct. 2037 (2000) (quoting grant of jurisdiction to investigate
obstruction of justice); see also United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, Joint App. at 91
(2000) (containing transcript of Motions hearing of June 26, 1998, United States v. Hubbell,
11 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (No. CR98-151-01-04)) [hereinafter Motions Hearing Tran-
script] (noting that OIC counsel stated that prosecution was looking for obstruction of justice
as Hubbell was believed to have received hush money not to cooperate with Whitewater investi-
gation).
27. See Motions Hearing Transcript, supra note 26, at 102-03 (stating that defense counsel
Nields speculated upon receiving subpoena that OIC was in fact seeking evidence to determine
if someone else had committed crime, but when that initial expectation was not realized,
evidence was used to prosecute Hubbell).
28. See Letter from John D. Bates, Deputy Independent Counsel, & Kenneth W. Starr,
Independent Counsel, to John W. Nields, Jr., Counsel to Webster Hubbell (Nov. 8, 1996) in
United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct 2037, Joint App. at 54-56 (2000) [hereinafter Bates & Starr
Letter] (countering Hubbell's Fifth Amendment privilege argument); Letter from John W.
Nields, Jr., Counsel to Webster Hubbell, to John D. Bates, Deputy Independent Counsel (Nov.
12, 1996) in United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, Joint App. at 57-58 (2000) [hereinafter
Nields Letter] (discussing application of Fifth Amendment issues to production of evidence and
referring to earlier telephone conversation regarding the same issues).
29. See generally Bates & Starr Letter, supra note 28 (contending that grant of use im-
munity would merely prohibit government from introducing evidence that documents were
produced, while not protecting use of document's contents); Nields Letter, supra note 28
(countering OIC's immunity argument and noting disagreement in courts on this point).
30. See Bates & Starr Letter, supra note 28, at I (recounting, inter alia, Yields's legal
argument).
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production," but not use of the contents, against Hubbell." OIC prosecutors
were prepared to proceed either by granting formal immunity pursuant to the
statute or informal immunity by letter.
32
In response, Nields stated that he thought the two sides shared the view
that the Fifth Amendment protected production of documents when a party is
"implicitly forced to say whether documents or other things are in existence
and under his control. '33 He noted, however, the OIC's disagreement with his
positions, both that the documents produced are "the fruit of the compelled act
of production 34 and that the immunity statute would treat those documents as
derived from the act of production. 35 Given the disagreement, Nields insisted
that his client receive full formal immunity under the terms of the statute. 6
Because of the position taken by Nields, the prosecution obtained an
order from the District Court compelling Hubbell to produce documents under
immunity before Hubbell's scheduled grand jury appearance.3" When Hubbell
was asked in the grand jury to produce the documents, he asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege and declined 'to state whether there are documents
within [his] possession, custody, or control responsive to the Subpoena.1
3
Upon presentation of the court order that demanded production of the listed
documents and granted use immunity "to the extent allowed by law, 39 Hub-
bell produced 13,120 pages of financial records.40
As a consequence ofthe information contained in the subpoenaed records,
Hubbell, his wife, accountant, and tax lawyer, were indicted on conspiracy,
31. Id. at3.
32. Id.
33. Nields Letter, supra note 28, at 1.
34. Id.
35. Id. at2.
36. Id. at 3. Nields sought assurance from the prosecution that it did not contend that it
could force production or that it could limit immunity protection to something less than the full
extent of the immunity statute. Nields asked to be notified if the OIC made such a claim. Id.
The OIC apparently did not respond with such a claim, and while it argued that the law
provided only narrow protection, it did not argue that the scope of Hubbell's immunity was less
than the statute ordinarily provided. Id. at 1-3.
37. Brief for Respondent Hubbell at 5, United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000)
(No. 99-166) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent Hubbell].
38. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, Joint App. at 62 (2000) [hereinafter Joint
App.] (containing transcript of Grand Jury testimony of Nov. 19, 1996 (No. GJ-96-3)).
39. Id. at 64; id. at 61 (containing Court Order ofNov. 14,1996 (No. GJ-96-3)); see also
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1995) (granting immunity to subject of proceeding when compelled to testify
or give information protected by privilege against self incrimination).
40. United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25,27 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd, vacated by 167
F.3d 552 (1999), affd, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
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mail and wire fraud, and various tax offenses involving efforts to keep Hub-
bell's income, particularly his income from consulting fees, away from credi-
tors and the Internal Revenue Service." The parties agreed on two important
points regarding the subpoenaed documents. First; Hubbell's indictment was
based on these documents, and prosecutors would have used evidence derived
from their contents to prosecute him.42 Second, the government would not
introduce the actual documents or refer in any way to Hubbell's production of
them in its presentation of evidence.43
Although the OIC later would argue that Hubbell's compelled produc-
tion of the documents did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights," it did not
seek to prevail on that legal point before granting use immunity in order to
obtain the documents.45 Whether litigating this issue would have produced
benefits to the OIC is unclear,46 and it might have resulted in substantial
41. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affid, 120 S. Ct 2037
(2000); Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
42. Brief for Petitioner OIC at 3, United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000) (No.
99-166) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner OIC] (admitting that documents produced were used
in investigation that led to indictment and asserting that government, to prove its case, had no
need to use actual documents produced or evidence that Hubbell possessed them); United States
v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 203, 2047-48 (2000) (noting that government makes no claim that
evidence it used to obtain indictment and proposed to use at trial came from sources independ-
ent of documents produced).
43. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 35; Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at3 (noting
that government to prove its case had no need to use actual documents produced or evidence
that Hubbell possessed documents); Hubbell, 120 S. Ct at 2046 (repeating government's posi-
tion that it would not have needed to introduce any of documents at Hubbell's trial). The
defense did not know that the government's claim would be carried out because trial had not
yet occurred. However, the defense did not contest the prosecution's intention to limit its
evidence or assert that the actual documents produced would necessarily be used in the prose-
cution.
44. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579-82 (discussing OIC's arguments that act of production was
not testimonial because government knew that Hubbell as businessman possessed classes of
business, consulting, and tax records and that act was not incriminating).
45. Nields argued in his brief to the Supreme Court that the OIC had waived the right to
contend that the act of production did not violate the Fifth Amendment on the grounds that it
was not communicative. Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 36. However, the
court of appeals had ruled on that issue, Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 579-82, and the Supreme Court
ignored Hubbell's waiver claim.
46. If granting immunity is constitutionally required, then an erroneous denial of the
target's Fifth Amendment claim by a trial judge that is later reversed on appeal would leave the
prosecutor in the same, or even worse, position than she would have occupied if she had granted
immunity to develop a new prosecution based on untainted evidence. However, if the trial
judge rules correctly and the outcome is not altered on appeal, litigating and even losing the
privilege issue would give the prosecution a beneficial signal to narrow the subpoena's demand
to evidence not protected by the Fifth Amendment In addition, the trial court's decision would
provide a context for evaluating the costs of compelling production.
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delays.' In any case, the OIC chose to require immediate production of the
documents by granting use immunity with whatever limitations on their use
such immunity might carry, and thereby bringing use immunity and its bur-
dens into the litigation.
Moreover, once immunity was granted and the documents were pro-
duced, the OIC used those documents to develop a criminal case against Hub-
bell, which it chose to prosecute." In his brief to the Supreme Court, Nields
repeatedly urged that the OIC was unprecedented in beginning its investiga-
tion by serving a subpoena upon a potential target and then prosecuting the
target for criminal acts disclosed in documents produced under a grant of
statutory use immunity.49
The OIC's failure to investigate first and issue the subpoena after inde-
pendently obtaining information about Hubbell left it in no position to estab-
lish through a separate investigation that it definitely knew, or would inevita-
bly have discovered, that the subpoenaed documents did in fact exist and were
in Hubbell's possession. As discussed below,5" if enough information existed
to establish that existence and possession were "foregone conclusions," Hub-
bell's Fifth Amendment claim would have been eliminated." However, the
OIC had no factual basis to establish this "foregone conclusion."
Another consequence of issuing the subpoena at the beginning of the
investigation, rather than after a thorough investigation, may have been that
Hubbell felt compelled to disclose a substantial quantity of incriminating
information in the response to the subpoena. Samuel Alito has argued that
people who have committed crimes generally volunteer incriminating informa-
tion in response to a subpoena only when they believe that production of the
47. Except when the target is incarcerated, delay almost always disadvantages the prose-
cution. I believe that the limited focus of the OIC in Hubbell resulted in an even greater than
normal prosecutorial aversion to delay. The perceived reasonable time frame for the OIC to
complete investigating the Clintons made speedy progress especially important
48. Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 3 (acknowledging that govemmenrt made
"substantial use" of contents of documents in investigation); Motions Hearing Transcript, supra
note 26, at 6 (presenting OIC statement that "only by virtue of the production of the documents
[had it] learned the facts that enabled [it] to then carry out a prosecution").
49. See Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 2 (positing that use of power to
grant immunity at outset of investigation to obtain evidence against witness was without
precedent).
50. See infra Part IIID (reasoning that subject has no legitimate Fifth Amendment claim
when prosecution has sufficient evidence of existence and possession).
51. See Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 2 (stating that OIC had to
concede that Hubbell's Fifth Amendment claim was valid because OIC had no knowledge of
existence of Hubbell's documents and thus could not claim that their existence was "foregone
conclusion").
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information will be more helpful than harmful.5 2 The suspect's decision to
disclose may result from the ambiguity of the requested information or the
likelihood that it will be unearthed anyway. 3
Hubbell was denied the chance to wait and see what the government could
find on its own and then calculate whether the undiscovered items would likely
remain unknown if he did not disclose them. If he falsely denied that the
documents existed, a claim that is categorically outside the protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination,' then the documents would remain subject
to independent discovery. Hubbell must have understood that some of the
documents would certainly be unearthed. If he was a calculating man, then
Hubbell likely judged that he had no real option but to reveal a substantial
volume of incriminating documents. Given that determination, he might well
have determined that it was in his best interest to be fully forthcoming and
gamble on winning his legal argument that any prosecution occurring after the
production order and inimunity would violate his constitutional rights. 5
The actions taken by the OIC against Hubbell appear quite unusual and
uncomfortably inquisitorial. However, when the person receivingthe subpoena
52. See Alito, supra note 6, at 47 (asserting that rational, unscrupulous witness will com-
ply with subpoena duces tecum only if neither document, nor his possession of it, is incriminat-
ing or if nonproduction is equally as incriminating as production).
53. See id. (hypothesizing that when possession can be shown or is expected, witness may
produce subpoenaed document or object hoping it will prove less damaging than nonproduction
or assuming that it would be discovered in any event). Whether Alito's arguments were applica-
ble to Hubbell is unknown, but they certainly are sensible when applied to guilty persons faced
with a demand for incriminating documents. A defendant's freedom to act dishonestly when in
his or her self-interest may be curtailed severely by the ethical obligations of defense counsel if
the existence of the documents is known to counsel. In this discussion, I do not mean to suggest
in any way that Hubbell's counsel entertained the possibility of permitting a false response.
54. The Fifth Amendment does not protect perjury even in the face of compulsion, and
a witness clearly can be prosecuted for perjury if he or she lies after being given immunity. See
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 126-32 (1980) (ruling that Fifth Amendment does
not protect witness against perjury after grant of immunity); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S.
174, 178 (1977) (recognizing prior holding that Fifth Amendment privilege does not condone
perjury); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1976) (plurality opinion) (recog-
nizing that without exception, Supreme Court jurisprudence forbids perjury even where
government exceeded constitutional powers in making inquiry); Glickstein v. United States, 222
U.S. 139, 141-42 (1911) (ruling that immunity afforded by constitutional guarantee does not
endow witness with license to commit perjury).
55. After the ruling in Hubbell, granting immunity generally may have the even stronger
effect of encouraging disclosure of incriminating documents as a matter of the target's self-
interest. Disclosing items arguably covered by the subpoena that the government has no
knowledge of may effectively immunize the target against the use of those documents. Thus,
targets may make calculations that take advantage of the opportunity to taint incriminating docu-
ments by producing them under the demand of an ambiguous or broadly drawn subpoena.
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is a "small fry" in an organization and the prosecutor's goal for the "fishing
expedition" is that it will produce evidence to land other, bigger fish, it may
not be so unusual for a prosecutor to issue a broad subpoena without specific
knowledge of the existence of the documents sought or that the individual
receiving the subpoena has them in his possession or control. When the OIC
went after evidence of obstruction of justice involving Hubbell, a small fish,
it may have intended to catch bigger fish, the Clintons.56 The OIC may not
have intended that Hubbell be prosecuted. Instead, the OIC may have hoped
that the records produced would lead to evidence of a conspiracy to support
Hubbell financially and to keep him quiet, with the President and First Lady
orchestrating that conspiracy.
The subpoena was veryunusual indeed if, as Nields argued, Hubbell was
the intended target from the beginning of the OIC's investigation. The ab-
sence of reported cases like Hubbell's indicates either that the Justice Depart-
ment can tell the difference between underlings and major targets, or that it
accepts its error when, by mistake, it initially goes after what turns out to be
its major or only catch. In Hubbell's case, by contrast, either the OIC could
not do the former, or it would not do the latter.
In my judgment, three decisions of the OIC coalesced to put the govern-
ment in an extremely unattractive and precarious litigation posture that likely
influenced the Supreme Court's potentially expansive decision undermining
the future of use immunity applied to documentary subpoenas. First, the OIC
opened its investigation of Hubbell with a broadly drafted subpoena without
first securing independent sources of information. Second, in response to
Hubbell's Fifth Amendment claim, it immediately granted use immunity
rather than litigating whether his claim satisfied the testimonial communica-
tion and incrimination elements of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Third,
upon failing to uncover evidence to transfer the OIC's attention from its initial
target to a larger catch, the OIC nevertheless prosecuted Hubbell. Each
decision might have been made by a regular prosecutor. However, the myopic
nature of the OIC's assignment and its limited time frame made the decisions
far more likely. In addition, the OIC was independent of, and insulated from,
larger institutional interests that might have caused ordinary federal prosecu-
tors to weigh carefully the consequences of combining these three decisions
and have possibly stopped the process.
These three decisions produced a frontal challenge to Fifth Amendment
restraint onthe use ofthe subpoena power to investigate crime, yet they did not
provide any easy way out for judges concerned about approving the use of an
56. Nields made this suggestion in his district court argument. Motions Hearing Tran-
script, supra note 26, at 102-03.
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investigative mechanism with quite an inquisitorial feel to American sensi-
bilities.5 7 Hubbell was being prosecuted for crimes of which the government
had no knowledge or even concrete suspicions until Hubbell himself provided
his personal business records. He was obligated to produce these documents
or face imprisonment, and to the extent required by the Fifth Amendment
regarding their production, he was guaranteed immunity from their use to
prosecute him.
Jurists at every level of this case were moved to ask difficult questions
probing the implications of approving the government's conduct and seeking
limits to the government's claim of entitlement to act as it had against Hub-
bell. 8 The OIC put these judges and justices in that uncomfortable position.
Further, the OIC had no readily available way to give the jurists the desired
reassurance and did not even attempt to ease their discomfort. The OIC's
prosecutors had either to concede a constitutional violation or prevail on one
of two "home run" positions that would give clear authorization for broad and
largely unfettered use of subpoenas to compel targets like Hubbell to provide
the basis for their own prosecution. The Solicitor General's Office might
have wanted to force the issue in such a stark fashion for a clear vindication
of a legal position, but I doubt it would have wanted to litigate the case in a
factual and legal context that so diminished its chances of prevailing.
Given these decisions, the Hubbell opinion still might have remained a
troubling decision for the government, but only by a divided panel of the
District of Columbia Circuit. Having pursued their two "home run" strategies
and lost in the district court, the OIC appealed, as it should have done, given
that the district court also ruled that the office had exceeded its jurisdiction. 9
OIC prevailed on the jurisdictional issue under a decision of a divided panel
of the District of Columbia Circuit."° On the Fifth Amendment issue (also by
57. Whether what I argue to be the basic anti-inquisitorial tradition of American criminal
procedure in fact has been applied generally to the doctrines governing the production of
documents at least is debatable. Prior to Hubbell, this highly technical area may have been
viewed as developing on its own and exhibiting a separate tradition. Its highly technical nature
and the complicated and compartmentalized treatment given Fifth Amendment issues by Fisher
permitted such a perspective. Before Hubbell, it arguably had become almost a constitutional
aside from much of modem Fifth Amendment doctrine.
58. See infra Part V.B.1 (positing that government lawyers could not have been com-
forted by hypotheticals posed by bench because they reveal Court's apprehension as to implica-
tions of government's view).
59. See United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25,29-33 (D.D.C. 1998),rev'd, vacated
by 167 F.3d 552 (1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000) (finding that investigation of Hubbell
exceeded jurisdiction of OIC because referral order exceeded authority of Special Division to
expand jurisdiction).
60. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 556-63 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affid, 120 S. Ct.
2037 (2000) (dismissing jurisdictional challenge).
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a divided vote, but with a different combination of judges), the circuit court
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings to determine
whether the 0IC could meet its burden under the "foregone conclusion"
doctrine.61 The circuit court further concluded that, ifthe OIC could not meet
its burden as to the existence of those documents, Hubbell's constitutional
rights had been violated by improper use of the contents of those documents
under the use immunity doctrine.62 The OIC sought rehearing and rehearing
en bane, but the circuit court denied both.
Rather than returning to the district court, the OIC conceded that it could
not meet the "reasonable particularity" standard63 set down by the court of
appeals for satisfying the "foregone conclusion" test.' Indeed, the 0IC made
no further showing of its knowledge about Hubbell's records at the time the
subpoena was served. Instead, the OIC and Hubbell reached a plea agreement
under which the OIC dismissed all counts against the other defendants who
had been jointly indicted with Hubbell in exchange for Hubbell's conditional
plea of guilty to a misdemeanor regarding part of the conduct covered by the
indictment.6" Under the agreement, Hubbell received no prison time and no
fine." The plea was contingent upon the OIC prevailing in the Supreme
Court, and if the OIC did not prevail, all charges against Hubbell would be
dismissed.67 On this record and with the extremely marginal prosecutorial
interest of securing a misdemeanor conviction without meaningful punish-
ment, the OIC sought certiorari. The Hubbell opinion was the result.
61. Id. at 585 (remanding case to determine whether government could establish requisite
knowledge of existence and possession ofdocuments sought in subpoena).
62. Id. The court included not only existence but also possession in its ruling with regard
to "foregone conclusion." Id. However, it appeared to link the violation of Hubbell's constitu-
tional rights principally to existence, with possession as merely a subsidiary concern. Id. at 582
(finding indirect incrimination specifically only with respect to acknowledging existence of
documents). The court stated that "[ilf the government did not have a reasonably particular
knowledge of subpoenaed documents' actual existence, let alone their possession by the sub-
poenaed party, and cannot prove knowledge of their existence through any independent means,
Kasigar forbids the derivative use of the information contained therein against the immunized
party." Id. at 585.
63. Id. at 579.
64. See United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037,2042 (2000) (noting OIC's concession
on remand that it could not meet "reasonable particularity" standard mandated by court of
appeals).
65. See Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 11 (summarizing terms of plea
agreement); Joint App., supra note 38, at 106-09 (containing plea agreement setting forth
conditions of plea).
66. See Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 11 (summarizing sentencing
terms); Joint App., supra note 38, at 109 (containing plea agreement outlining punishment).
67. See Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 11 (stating contingency agree-
ment); Joint App., supra note 38, at 109 (setting contingency agreement).
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Private litigants often take cases to the Supreme Court despite poor
prospects for success. State prosecutors likely do so on occasion as well.
However, because of its institutional isolation and its narrow prosecutorial
interests, the OIC gave awaythe advantage the federal government usually has
in litigating with the big picture in mind and having the freedom to accept an
immediate loss if it serves the government's overall interest. The government
had only two basic "home run" positions that would allow it to overcome
Hubbell's arguments. It pressed and lost and thereby definitively eliminated
the viability of those positions, badly damaged the value to prosecutors of use
immunity for documentary subpoenas, likely altered the environment in the
lower courts as to documentary subpoenas for years to come, and prompted
the Court to condemn these inquisitorial excesses through language that
broadly paints the Fifth Amendment protection." In sum, the OIC in Hubbell
did substantial immediate and long-term damage to prosecutorial interests.
While the government may possibly reclaim some of the lost ground in future
decisions, the result for the government in Hubbell is about as negative as
could be expected from the currently constituted Supreme Court. The posture
of the case gave the Court very little room other than to decide the case and
the law against the government and afforded the Court an opportunity to
fashion a decision on broad conceptual grounds.
I1I. Act of Production Doctrine and Use Immunity
Assessing whether requiring Hubbell to provide documents would violate
his Fifth Amendment privilege involves a set of concepts that collectively are
called the "act of production doctrine."69 This doctrine admittedly is arcane
and complicated. The OIC made the picture more complex by compelling
production under a grant of use immunity which applied the use immunity
doctrine to the act of production. I begin with the basic contours ofthe appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment to producing documents - the act of produc-
tion doctrine. Primarily, I will discuss the doctrine as applied to documents,
though the same principles apply to the production of other tangible objects,
such as guns, knives, and contraband.70 In some of the hypothetical problems
68. See infra Parts V.C (describing Court's use of broad Fifth Amendment rhetoric to
explain nature of violation); Part V.3.1 (analyzing set of hypotheticals used by Court that
displayed its concern with potentially inquisitorial aspects of use of subpoenas to gather
evidence from those suspected of crime).
69. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,410-13 (1976) (noting that "act of produc-
ing evidence" may have communicative aspects that can violate Fifth Amendment and setting
out initial propositions from which act of production doctrine has developed).
70. See, e.g., Dep't of Soc. Sere. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1990) (applying
act of production doctrine to requirement that mother deliver her child to authorities under court
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discussed later, I will use weapons instead of documents because their more
obviously incriminating character makes compelling their disclosure more
evocative of Fifth Amendment values.
Under the modem Supreme Court's understanding of the Fifth Amend-
ment, prosecutorial use of documents that were prepared voluntarily does not
itself violate the Constitution.1 Thus, if the government comes to possess
those documents without involving the preparer in any way, the Fifth Amend-
ment is not implicated. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment is not involved even
if the government seizes those documents through, for example, a search
conducted with or without a warrant. 2 In short, use of the contents ofvolun-
tarily prepared documents does not directly violate the Fifth Amendment,
even if those documents are personal and private and their contents are highly
incriminating.
73
The protections of the Fifth Amendment may be available, however, if
the documents are obtained by a grand jury subpoena because responding to
the subpoena may involve incriminating testimonial communication. An
order requiring the production of pre-existing documents violates the protec-
tion against compulsory self-incrimination if: (1) compulsion, (2) testimonial
order); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1240-45 (Mass. 1980) (applying doctrine
to order production of specifically identified revolver).
71. Fisher, 425 U.S. at409-10 (describing how series of decisions compel conclusion that
government use of voluntarily prepared documents does not violate Fifth Amendment).
72. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,470-77 (1976) (holding that search that produced
records that previously had been voluntarily prepared did not implicate Fifth Amendment).
73. This position is the culmination of a series of cases that dismantled Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which had concluded that a search for private papers violated the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 634-35. One part of the story
developed out of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in cases such as Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967), which overruled Gouledv. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) and allowed
for searches for mere evidence, and Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), which ruled
that a search for private papers authorized under the Fourth Amendment did not independently
offend the Fifth Amendment Another part of the story proceeded through Fifth Amendment
analysis that concludes that the privilege against self-incrimination protects compelled commu-
nications or testimony, but does not prohibit obtaining incriminating evidence from the suspect.
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (holding that compelled participation
in lineup did not violate Fifth Amendment); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)
(holding withdrawal of defendant's blood sample is not violative of Fifth Amendment).
To be entirely fair, the Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving the seizure of an
extremely private document, such as a diary. Oceasionally, lower court cases have held that such
a seizure violates the FifthAmendment. See, e.g., Moyer v. Commonwealth, 520 S.E.2d 371,
373-76 (Va. Ct App. 1999) (holding that use of diary violated Fifth Amendment privilege).
However, that position clearly is not the generally held view of the law. See Moyer v. Common-
wealth, 531 S.E2d 580,583-87 (Va. Ct App. 2000) (en banc) (reversing earlier panel decision
that found Fifth Amendment violation in seizing defendant's diary under search warrant).
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communication, and (3) incrimination are all present. The Court first articu-
lated this general structure in the seminal case of Fisher v. United States.74
A. Compulsion
Satisfying the compulsion issue is guaranteed in cases in which a grand
jury has commanded production under a subpoena. The subpoena constitutes
legal compulsion because it is backed by coercive sanctions, including incar-
ceration as a result of defying an order to produce.
B. Testimonial Communication
The fact that the underlying documents contain communications made
previously bythe target does not satisfythe testimonial communication require-
ment.75 Instead, communication must be implicit in providing the documents
in response to subpoena - communication through the act of production - in
order to constitute a testimonial communication bythe person responding to the
subpoena.76
Testimonial communications often result from compliance with the
demands of a subpoena. Conceptually, the response to every subpoena for
documents answers a set of implicit questions posed by the subpoena. Courts
accept that production of documents specified in the subpoena may acknowl-
edge (1) authenticity of the documents or that the responding party at least
believes that they are the ones demanded, (2) possession or control of the
documents, and (3) the existence of such documents."
C. Incrimination
Satisfying the incrimination requirement remains murky after Hubbell.
However, it is clear that the incrimination requirement excludes from consid-
eration trifling or imaginary, as opposed to substantial or real, prospects of
74. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (asserting that Fifth Amendment applies only when
accused is compelled to make incriminating testimonial communication).
75. See id. at 409-10 (ruling that if production of documents does not require target to
restate, repeat, or affirm truth of the contents, it does not compel testimony regardless of
whether items produced contained earlier, voluntarily made communications).
76. See id. at 410 (acknowledging that "act of producing evidence" may have communica-
tive aspects as to existence, possession, and authenticity of that evidence).
77. See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 553, 567-68 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affid, 120 S.
Ct. 2037 (2000) (dividing potential communicative aspects of production into four elements and
distinguishing between showing authenticity of items and establishing that party responding
believed those items were ones specified in subpoena).
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incrimination?8 and requires independent judgment rather than the self-suffi-
cient claim of the target. 9
A major unresolved question is whether the incriminating contents of
documents may be considered in determining whether proving possession
through the act of production satisfies the incrimination requirement of the
Fifth Amendment.8" Possession of some items is directly incriminating, and it
is clear that indirect use of evidence obtained in violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination violates the Fifth Amendment."' The principal ques-
tion may be posed as follows: Are the incriminating contents of ordinary
documents excluded from consideration when deciding whether possession of
ordinary documents is indirectly incrimination, but considered when pre-
venting indirect use of an established constitutional violation? While the
incrimination requirement is a largely ignored factor that is unlikely to resolve
major issues, it could play an important role in resolving whether the target can
be forced to produce items whose location is unknown. The incrimination
concept might allow the Court to balance its demonstrated interest in continu-
ing the viability of subpoenas of documents from targets against its newly
identified concern that Fisher's act of production doctrine may approve results
that are unacceptably inquisitorial, particularly for objects that are superficially
incriminating. I will set out what I see as the chief competitors for how the
incrimination requirement ultimately might be interpreted respecting the act of
production doctrine.
78. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) ("The central standard for the
privilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."); see also Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 614
n.13 (1984) (reiterating that standard). This is a relatively demanding formulation of the degree
of threat of incrimination required to trigger protection. Other more expansive descriptions also
have been given by the Supreme Court "The privilege... not only extends to answers that
would in themselves support a conviction... but likewise embraces those which would furnish
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute .... " Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S.
479,486 (1951).
79. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (acknowledging that "act of
producing evidence" may have communicative aspects as to existence, possession, and authen-
ticity of that evidence).
80. See Doe 1, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17 (noting that grant of use immunity need not cover
contents of business records because immunity need only protect defendant from self-incrimina-
lion that might accompany production).
81. See, e.g., Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (holding that witness is protected against require-
ment to give answers "which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute").
Protection against derivative use exists under the privilege against self-incrimination whether
or not immunity is granted. The relationship between consideration of the contents to determine
whether possession is incriminating and, if incrimination is found, the prohibition against
indirect use of the fruits of a Fifth Amendment violation, including access to the contents of
documents gained because of the target's possession of them, is examined, infra Part I[IE.
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The first hypothesis is that the communicative act of production must be
incriminating either for possession or existence entirely separate from the
incriminating contents ofthe document. Fisher suggested this interpretatione
and it is supported by a footnote in the later Doe I opinion.83 Its narrowness,
however, is difficult to square with the results in Doe P and impossible to
reconcile with both the opinion and the result in Hubbell. This narrow con-
struction of incrimination can no longer be maintained.
The second hypothesis is that, if the prosecution is ignorant of the
existence of the document, the contents of the incriminating document may
be used to determine whether the incrimination requirement is satisfied
because any use of those contents is derived from an indirect use of the prose-
cution's knowledge of the existence of the document, which was obtained
through the act of production." However, incrimination through possession
is to be construed more narrowly and involves only possession that itself
incriminates separate from consideration of the incriminating content of a
document. Fisher provides only an indirect theoretical basis for making this
proposed distinction between using the incriminating nature of contents to
establish indirect incrimination regarding the document's existence, but not
regarding possession." This second hypothesis is still viable after Hubbell,but it remains in search of a theory.
82. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412 (suggesting this interpretation by observation that exis-
tence or possession of accountant's papers posed no realistic threat of incrimination without any
analysis whether their contents might be incriminating).
83. Doe I,465 U.S. at 617 n.17.
84. The Court affirmed the lower courts' finding that the subpoenas were testimonial and
incriminating without any showing that they incriminated separate from considering their con-
tents. Id. at 613-14.
85. In Hubbell, the court of appeals used derivative analysis to link incriminating contents
of documents to the act of production as to existence, terming this indirect incrimination. It
stated that "in acknowledging the existence of the Bridgeport Group and its bank account at
Pulaski Bank, Hubbell provided a link in the chain of evidence used by the Independent
Counsel to substantiate the criminal charges against him - an instance of indirect incrimina-
tion." United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 553, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affd, 120 S. Ct. 2037
(2000).
86. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 25-27. I argued that Fisher's broadly stated conclu-
sion that production of a document cannot be avoided simply because the document's contents
are incriminating is implicitly inconsistent with a determination that possession is incriminating
if the document's contents incriminate because the issue of possession could so frequently be
in contest. Id. Accordingly, proof of possession by the act of production ought to incriminate
the defendant more directly. Id. By contrast, proof of existence can only incriminate as a result
of consideration of the contents, and so incriminating contents must be suficient to satisfy the
incrimination requirement or establishing existence could never violate the Fifth Amendment
Id. The Fisher opinion, however, fails to note any of these secondary distinctions. See Fisher
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The third hypothesis is that the incrimination requirement can be satisfied
by indirect incrimination that would result through potential prosecutorial use
of the contents of the document. It is based on the theory that the use of the
document depends upon both the knowledge of the document's existence and
the government's access to it, the latter depending upon the target acknowl-
edging possession or access by complying with the subpoena. As to both
existence and possession, the principle that indirect use of a Fifth Amendment
violation is prohibited' supports this hypothesis. I will leave detailed discus-
sion of these issues until Part V.88
While the OIC made a weak argument before the court of appeals that
Hubbell's production of the documents was not incriminating," it did not
pursue that claim in the Supreme Court, leaving the application of that con-
cept to the facts of Hubbell almost entirely unexamined. Instead, the OIC
argued that producing the documents did not constitute a testimonial commu-
nication.9" That contention was founded on the Supreme Court's "foregone
conclusion" doctrine, which applies to the testimonial communication element
of production, and, if satisfied, eliminates that element and thereby avoids a
Fifth Amendment violation altogether."
D. "Foregone Conclusion"
In Fisher, the Supreme Court ruled that if existence or possession of
documents was a "foregone conclusion" then the act of producing them was
not testimonial and the Fifth Amendment did not apply.' Despite coining the
term and finding the concept satisfied,"3 the Supreme Court has never given
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412 (1976) (treating possession and existence of papers
identically).
87. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892) (stating that privilege
against self-incrimination protects against both direct and indirect use of witness' testimony).
88. See inffra Part V.D (analyzing possible implications of Court's concern with inquisito-
rial implications of use of subpoenas to obtain incriminating evidence from targets, its applica-
tion in Hubbell, and interplay between proof of possession and significance that contents of
documents may incriminate).
89. See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 581-82 (noting that OIC had advocated a standard that was
too narrow).
90. Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 11-32.
91. Id. at32.
92. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
93. The Court stated cryptically:
The existence and location of the papers are a "foregone conclusion" and the
taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information
by conceding that he in fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by
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real definition to that doctrine. I believe the best way to understand the doc-
trine is that:
when an implicit as opposed to an explicit communication is involved, it
is necessary to consider whether the government is really asking a "ques-
tion" through the subpoena. Granted, the defendant's response to a docu-
mentary subpoena always reveals that the item does or does not exist; the
government cannot eliminate the implicit question about the document's
existence no matter how it phrases the subpoena's demand. But if the
government already knows the answerto that question and is truly uninter-
ested inthe implicit answerprovidedbyproduction, the witness' gratuitous
communication of it should not violate the fifth amendment.94
A prosecutor may wish that she could eliminate the implicit testimonial
aspects of production because all she wants are the pre-existing documents
without any new communications attached, but the two elements cannot be
separated. The prosecutor can, however, prove that the prosecution already
knows everything the target will communicate implicitly through the act of
production. Doing this establishes that what would have been a testimonial
communication is instead a "foregone conclusion" and therefore the Fifth
Amendment is inapplicable because one of its requirements is lacking.
What the "foregone conclusion" concept does is to limit the act of
production to surrender or delivery of a document rather than communication
about it. It is important to note that Fisher recognized, and the majority in
Hubbell accepted, that forcing a target to deliver incriminating evidence
through a subpoena is permissible under the Fifth Amendment without any
grant of immunity.95
Given the above analysis, the term "foregone conclusion" connotes that
full awareness of the information provided by the implicit communication is
required. The "foregone conclusion doctrine" should not be seen as the equiva-
lent of probable cause because it does more. It is not an alternative means of
proofthat renders a constitutional violation harmless; rather, it eliminates Fifth
enforcement of the summons "no constitutional rights are touched. The question
is not of testimony but of surrender."
Id. (quotingIn re Harris, 221 U.S. 274,279 (1911)).
94. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 32; see also 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8.13(a),
at 257 (adopting analysis described in text).
95. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. In Hubbell, Justice Stevens contrasted the impermissible
requirement under the Fifth Amendment of giving the combination to a safe with the permissi-
ble result of "being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox." United States v. Hubbell, 120
S. Ct 2037, 2047 (2000); cf id. at 2050-54 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Fisher's
interpretation of Fifth Amendment likely is incorrect and that Court should properly interpret
privilege to bar not only compelled testimonial acts but also compelled production of evidence);
infra Part V.F (describing Justice Thomas's analysis).
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Amendment protection by rendering the act of production non-communicative
and therefore is properly much more demanding than probable cause.96
If my interpretation ofthe doctrine is correct, its onerous requirements can
cause substantial problems to the elimination of the testimonial component
when readily mobile objects are subpoenaed. The options are either: (1) to
dilute the "foregone conclusion" concept when applied to possession; (2) to
place greater emphasis on the significance of the incrimination requirement,
construing it to be satisfied as to possession only when relatively directly
incriminating items are involved;' or (3) largely to eliminate the utility of sub-
poenas served on targets that demand production of readily mobile documents.
E. Use Immunity
If a witness has a valid self-incrimination claim, he or she can neverthe-
less be compelled to testify if granted use immunity.'e The use immunity doc-
trine, which receives much of its definition from Kastigar v. United States,9
protects against both direct and indirect use of compelled testimony and any
information derived from the compelled evidence."° If evidence is compelled
96. As discussed later in this Article, the actual existence of probable cause to obtain the
evidence in some circumstances would establish that any violation of the Fifth Amendment was
inconsequential because of the "inevitable discovery" of the same evidence through untaned
independent means. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing how, in limited factual situations, prospect
of seizure of evidence that would have been valid under Fourth Amendment would provide
alternative source for evidence).
97. Imposing such a limitation would resolve the incrimination issue raised earlier in a
narrow fashion consistent with Fisher. For example, possession of contraband is clearly incrim-
inating because of the facially incriminating nature of the illegal substance. Possession of one's
own diary is different, however. Possession of an item of this latter type is not only legal, but
also proof of possession typically will not further incriminate the author.
Documents and tangible objects exhibit various levels of incrimination from the facially
incriminating quality of contraband to incrimination that results only from a detailed analysis
of the contents of facially innocuous documents. A number of these categories are discussed
infra Part V.D. How revealing possession interacts with the different levels of incrimination
along this continuum remains uncertain after Hubbell.
98. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (holding that statutory use
immunity is coextensive with Fifth Amendment privilege and, if granted, supplants privilege).
99. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
100. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460-62 (1972). In Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892), the Supreme Court struck down a statute that com-
pelled testimony while granting only protection against use of the witness' testimony in any
subsequent prosecution. In Kastigar, the Court ruled a later statute constitutional that protected
against both direct and indirect use, including investigatory leads. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
However, only immunity against use of the evidence is required and not immunity from prose-
cution, commonly known as transactional immunity. Id. at 453.
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under a grant of immunity and the target is subsequently prosecuted, then the
government has the burden of demonstrating that its evidence is untainted."'
It bears an "affinative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony."0
2
Prosecutors often view as a real challenge the requirement that they prove
that they did not violate the guarantees attendant to a grant of use immunity
during a subsequent prosecution. Granting immunity carries with it two
clear consequences, although it goes no further than the Fifth Amendment
requires and constitutes a set of requirements that the prosecution can often
readily meet.' 4 First, the burden falls on the prosecution to prove that no use
was made of the evidence." 5 Second, the no use requirement means that not
only direct but also all indirect uses are prohibited."°
1V The Impact of the Hubbell Case on Act ofProduction Law
The implications of the Hubbell case for act of production law ultimately
may be very far-reaching. I begin my analysis by narrowly focusing on what
the case clearly decided. I then progressively expand that focus."°
Two categorical ("home run") arguments by the government were defini-
tively laid to rest by Hubbell. The first was that, for a subpoena directed to
a businessman, the government needed only to know that typically business-
men have documents in certain broad classes, such as general business and tax
records."° The second was that only direct use of the act of production was
101. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-62 (describing consequence to government if target is
granted immunity and subsequently prosecuted).
102. Id. at460.
103. See3 1 BEALEETAL, GRANDJURYLAWAND PRACTICE § 7.20, at59-61 (2d ed. 2000)
(noting both that courts do not look favorably on prosecution of witnesses who have previously
received immunity and inconsistency of approaches used in determining whether evidence is
tainted); LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 11, § 8.11 (b), at 218-25 (describing methods that prosecu-
tors use to comply with Kasfigar and uncertainties and challenges they face).
104. See 2 BEALE ET AL., supra note 103, § 7.20, at 63, 65-66 (indicating factors and
methods that typically are successful for prosecution); 3 LAFAVEETAL., supra note 11, § 8.11(b),
at 221 (setting out circumstances in which prosecution is most likely to prevail).
105. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at460-62.
106. Id. at453,460-62.
107. Because of the complexity of the issues, my treatment of the act of production doctrine
purposefully involves repetition as the applications become progressively more complicated and
the analyses more sophisticated. As new levels of complexity are introduced, I hope repetition
will prove useful rather than redundant.
108. See Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 32-35 (arguing that "foregone conclu-
sion" established as to basic classes of business documents by target's status as businessman);
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forbidden under the Fifth Amendment and a grant of use immunity." Both
arguments are no longer viable.
A. The Category of General Business Documents Does Not Automatically
Meet the "Foregone Conclusion" Standard
The OIC's presentation of the "foregone conclusion" issue was either
cavalier11° or intentionally challenging. It argued that, like every other busi-
nessman, Hubbell necessarily had a broad range of business related documents
and that the subpoena need only list those broad categories.' Given the
breadth of the subpoena and the lack of a showing of particularized knowl-
edge, 12 the OIC should have been prepared to grant use immunity without
concern for avoiding a finding that production of the documents was testimo-
nial. Orthe OIC was deliberately seeking to test the limits ofthe law and obtain
either a beneficial ruling that blunderbuss subpoenas are adequate in all busi-
ness records scenarios or a damaging ruling that more is always required.
The position that a broad subpoena calling for production of classes of
business records falls outside the protection ofthe Fifth Amendment under the
"foregone conclusion" doctrine was rejected theoretically and factually. The
United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2048 (2000) (rejecting government's contention that
deficiency in knowledge is cured as to broad categories of business and tax documents de-
scribed in subpoena).
109. See Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 18-23 (arguing that only direct use of
physical act of production is protected by Constitution); Hubbell, 120 S. Ct at 2047 (rejecting
government's argument that act of production should be limited to physical act divorced from
its implicit testimonial aspects).
110. Indeed, Hubbell's attorney claimed in the Supreme Court that the issue had been
waived in the district court, Brief for Respondent Hubbell, supra note 37, at 36, but this claim
was not accepted by the Court. The court of appeals clearly had reached the merits of the claim
based on OIC arguments. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 553, 578-82 (D.C. Cir. 1999),
affid, 120 S. Ct 2037 (2000). The OIC's effort, however, hardly was vigorous in the trial court.
Motions Hearing Transcript, supra note 26, at 90, 95 (presenting argument of David Birhak that
OIC could have "gotten a Dun & Bradstreet on" Hubbell and through it obtained bank, credit
card, and accountant records but it did not need to take such action before granting immunity,
and that OIC could have first contested Hubbell's Fifth Amendment claim based on "foregone
conclusion" and lack of incrimination grounds but again it was not required to proceed in that
sequence).
111. See Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 32-35 (arguing that "foregone conclu-
sion" was established as to basic classes of business documents by target's status as business-
man).
112. See Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2046 (describing OIC's "fishing expedition"); Motions
Hearing Transcript, supra note 26, at 5-6 (conceding that although it was not accurate to say
that OIC had no idea of what it was going to find, prosecution certainly was not in position to
show "with reasonable particularity what the documents contained").
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government argued 'that the communicative aspect of respondent's act of
producing ordinary business records is insufficiently 'testimonial' to support
a claim of privilege because the existence and possession of such records by
any businessman is a 'foregone conclusion"' under Fisher."3 The Court,
however, concluded that the argument misread Fisher and ignored Doe .114
The Court also summarily rejected the fact-based claim that businessmen,
such as Hubbell, "will always possess general business and tax records that
fall within the broad categories described in [the Hubbell] subpoena."'1 5 The
Court labeled this claim "overbroad," and concluded that the position had
been implicitly rejected by its earlier decision in Doe I, in which it had upheld
the district court's ruling that producing documents under subpoenas demand-
ing "several broad categories of general business records" involved testimo-
nial self-incrimination. 6
The Court did not decide which test should be used in deciding the
"foregone conclusion" question. It chose not to consider whether the "reason-
able particularity" test adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit to imple-
ment the "foregone conclusion" concept was appropriate.' 7 Instead, the Court
concluded that resolving the issue was unnecessary because "[w]hatever the
scope of this 'foregone conclusion' rationale, the facts of this case plainly fall
outside of it.""
518
B. Subpoenaed Documents Are Not 'Manna from Heaven"
The second categorical argument that the OIC advanced reflects a long
advocated government position."9 Under that argument, immunity would
entail virtually no consequences regarding the derivative use of the contents





117. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affd, 120 S. Ct 2037
(2000).
118. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2048 (2000); see also infra Part V.E
(briefly discussing "reasonable particularity" issue).
119. SeeAlito,supra note 6, at 59-60,27 n.* (arguing in his 1986 article, which was written
after leaving Solicitor General's Office but before leaving Justice Department, that contents of
documents under Fifth Amendment should be analyzed as if they had magically appeared in
grand jury room). In its Petition for Certiorari, the OIC characterized this position as that
"advanced by the Department of Justice and by Judge Samuel Alito (writing extra-judicially)."
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari].
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of documents acquired by subpoena and would not prohibit use of the contents
of such documents, regardless of whether identity, possession, or existence
was previously unknown to the government 2 Hubbell firmly laid to rest that
extreme position.1
2 '
This argument may be stated in several ways. The most colorful state-
ment involves the biblical reference of "manna from heaven" whereby God
fed the Children of Israel as they wandered in the wilderness by a form of
food - manna - that mysteriously appeared each morning and apparently came
from Heaven." The government's position was that a witness granted use
immunity would be shielded only "from the use of any information resulting
from his subpoena response 'beyond what the prosecutor would receive if the
documents appeared in the grand jury room or in his office unsolicited and
unmarked, like manna from heaven."
'123
The OIC set out the government's position more fully, but less colorfully:
Whateverthe Courtmight conclude about sometrivialtestimonial communica-
tion implicit in respondent's act ofproducingthe documents inthis case, it is
not plausible to contend thatthe information contained in those documents -
voluntarily recorded by respondent (or others) long before compulsion was
brought to bear - somehow is derived from that communication.
Wereadily agreethatthe government hasthe documents- andthe infor-
mation that they contain-because respondent gave them to the government
But the government's possession ofthe documents is the fruit only of a simple
physical act - the act of producing the documents. The contrary view- that
the documents are derived from some testimonial communication - rests on
the tortured notion that the government obtained the documents not through
the physical act ofproduction, but through respondent's implicit testimonial
admission that the documents existed, an admission that is irrelevant to any
substantive issue."'
The Court rejected the government's attempt to limit use immunity to direct
uses by the prosecution of the communicative aspects of the act of production
120. See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 602 (Williams, J., dissenting on act of production question)
(arguing that court should adopt "manna from heaven" argument, which would place extremely
limited constraints on government use of incriminating documents obtained under subpoena).
121. See Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2047 (deciding that immunity precluded derivative use of
documents because respondent used his knowledge to identify documents).
122. See Exodus 16:9-36 (describing appearance of manna).
123. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct at 2041-42 (quoting United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 553,602
(D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000) (Williams, 3., dissenting)); see also Brief of
Amicus Curiae at 25, Hubbell (No. 99-166). Samuel Alito, who is now a judge on the Third
Circuit, articulated the government's position after he left the Solicitor General's Office, but
while he was still at the Justice Department. Alito, supra note 6, at 60,27 n.*.
124. Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 29.
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and never to the contents."2 The Court also rejected the government's "ane-
mic view of respondent's act of production as a mere physical act that is
principally non-testimonial in character and can be entirely divorced from its
'implicit' testimonial aspect.1
126
C. The Essence of the Fifth Amendment Violation
Assessing the extent to which the Hubbell opinion will curtail prosecu-
tors' ability to use evidence obtained after granting use immunity against the
target largely depends upon discerning what the Court found to be the core of
the constitutional violation. That determination turns on what aspect of the
act of production violated the Fifth Amendment and on the basic conceptual-
ization of what about that act violated self-incrimination theory.
In discussing what act violated the Fifth Amendment, the Court stated
that the requirements that the witness disclose the "existence and location,"
127
"existence or the whereabouts,""2 and "existence of sources,' 29 and identify
"the hundreds of documents" '13 constituted the violation. The Court repeat-
edly noted that the subpoena required the target to reveal both existence and
location.' It also found that requiring the identification of documents was
improper.13 2 However, because the Hubbell subpoena used broad categories,
"identifying" apparently means finding or selecting the appropriate documents,
rather than the more narrow concept of authenticating them as the documents
particularly described inthe subpoenam ' Nevertheless, eventhough additional
terms were used, the Court's consistent focus of concern was the subpoena
requirement to reveal the existence of unknown documents."M The Court
125. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037,2048 (2000).
126. Id. at 2047.
127. Id. at 2046,2048.
128. Id. at2048.
129. Id. at 2047.
130. Id.
131. Id. at2046,2048.
132. The term "identifying," used in the sense of finding or selecting, is another way to
describe providing information of the existence of unknown documents. Id. at 2047 (observing
that Hubbell was required to "identify the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in
the subpoena" and to provide "an accurate inventory of many sources of potentially incriminat-
ing evidence"). When applied to a subpoena that covers broad categories of information, the
term prohibits requiring the target to find or select the relevant documents from within a broad
category that the prosecution may generally know exists.
133. Id.
134. Id. (referring to "the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence" in its
summary statement).
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stated, "[i]n sum, we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being
compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the exis-
tence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence."'35
On the other hand, although the Court's emphasis was on establishing the
existence of previously unknown documents, it did not say that a constitu-
tional violation occurred only because the subpoena required that revelation.
Indeed, the opinion may suggest that the prosecution's lack of knowledge of
possession would have produced the same result.'36 However, the Court did
not clearly state this result, let alone specify the circumstances under which
it would be warranted.
The Court also spoke in broadly applicable terminology, identifying the
Fifth Amendment values offended by the subpoena at a more conceptual level.
It stated that "[iut was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make exten-
sive use of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of
documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena.' 37 Further, "[i]t was
only through respondent's trthful reply to the subpoena that the Government
received the incriminating documents of which it made 'substantial use... in
the investigation that lead to the indictment.
'" 13
While it could be read more broadly, the first statement is consistent with
a focus on the prosecution's learning of the existence of documents through
the target's efforts to find and select them from a broadly defined group of
general business documents that most individuals in Hubbell's position would
possess. 39 However, if as the second statement indicates, a documentary
subpoena violates the Constitution any time a truthful response by the target
allows the government to receive incriminating documents, the scope of pro-
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 2048 (concluding that act of production had testimonial aspects "at least with
respect to the existence and location of the documents").
137. Id. at2047.
138. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42).
139. If the statement is intended to convey the more narrow sense of identifying docu-
ments, as in "authenticating" them, the consequences are not great in the typical situation. Act
of production immunity as to authenticity is relatively easy to circumvent in many situations by
independent proof of authenticity. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 40-43. Indeed, the communica-
tive aspect of authentication can be eliminated by a very specific demand in the subpoena that
renders the response nontestimonial, and therefore does not require immunity. Id. at 14-15. In
a ease such as Hubbell, with the broad categories in the subpoena and the lack of government
knowledge of the existence of documents, either eliminating the testimonial aspect of identify-
ing documents in the narrow authentication sense or establishing an independent source once
immunity is granted would not be easy. However, the difficulties in authentication should be
seen as an indirect consequence of the government's total lack of knowledge of existence of the
documents, rather than as constituting a significant independent barrier to constitutional pro-
duction and use of the documents.
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tection is much broader. The second formulation also appears to treat reveal-
ing location as a Fifth Amendment violation and seems to require that use
immunity be granted, rendering any use of the documents' contents uncon-
stitutional. While the Court must resolve other issues before the full Fifth
Amendment consequences are felt, treating the disclosure of location the same
as revealing existence may significantly expand the impact of Fifth Amend-
ment protection and restrict the effective reach of subpoenas directed at poten-
tial prosecution targets.
D. The Use of Contents of Unknown Documents Violates Use Immunity
I will examine some of the implications of how much farther these state-
ments and the Court's analysis may carry the protections of the privilege
below. However, while the theory may not be entirely clear, one result is: If,
after the application of the "foregone conclusion" test, the existence of docu-
ments is testimonial, the use of the contents of the documents obtained under
use immunity violates the Fifth Amendment. After Hubbell, use of the con-
tents of the documents is not independent of the act of production if the
government did not previously know of the existence of those documents. 40
Thus, the prohibition against the derivative use of documents means that the
prosecution cannot use their contents when the it cannot clearly show its prior
knowledge that the documents existed.
E. The Practical Death of Use Immunity for Unknown Documents
As should have been obvious to the 0IC, Hubbell's Fifth Amendment
assertion in response to the subpoena for documents clearly was plausible.
Any prosecutor in this situation has three principal options that would either
eliminate the Fifth Amendment barrier or overcome it. First, the prosecution
can argue that production is not testimonial. Second, it can contend that
production is not incriminating. Third, assuming the requisites of the Fifth
Amendment are found to be present, it can grant use immunity to the target for
the act ofproduction. The first two responses eliminate the Fifth Amendment
claim and, therefore, provide the documents to the prosecutor without limiting
or eliminating their usefulness in prosecuting the individual. The final re-
sponse, immunity, permits the prosecutor to receive the documents, but does
so with substantial or total limitation on the use of the documents against the
target. As noted earlier, the OIC immediately chose the third option and
140. As noted earlier, the Court also found the act of identifying the documents improper.
See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. I believe this is equivalent to disclosing other-
wise unknown existence where selection of the relevant items is required from a much broader
category that the government knew existed only in general categories. Such knowledge of the
class did not establish existence of a subset of relevant documents.
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promptly secured the documents coupled with the likely consequences of
granting use immunity.
41
Whatever its broader import may prove to be, the clear legacy of Hubbell
is the death of use immunity as a tool in cases involving targets of subpoenas
for documents where the existence of the documents is not known. Now the
important battle is the determination of the extent of prosecutorial knowledge
necessary to establish that the existence of the documents is a "foregone
conclusion." In that context, Hubbell eliminated the most useful prosecutorial
argument. The Court rejected, apparently categorically, broad subpoenas cov-
ering classes of business records under a general claim that all businessmen
possess them.142 The Court indicated that the problem was more than just the
particular set of overbroad categories used in Hubbell, stating that an effort
to use broad categories had also been rejected in Doe L14' The Court said that
the use of broad categories constitutes a generally unacceptable approach and
the prosecution must show "prior knowledge" of existence.144
The granting of use immunity also might create a trap for the govern-
ment. If the subpoena potentially calls for an item of evidence of which the
government is unaware, a target may be tempted to provide it, knowing that
the government will then bear a heavy burden of showing that the contents of
the documents were not used in any fashion to convict him. 4  Absent very
careful treatment of the documents by the prosecution, such information may
make its way into the fabric of the evidence and, absent a clear independent
source for all the contents, prove devastating for successful prosecution of the
subpoena's recipient for conduct covered by the documents. 46 The danger
inherent in granting use immunity to targets is now great; indeed, in most
cases use immunity generally will be inconsistent with prosecuting the target
on charges that relate to the documents produced.'47 Instead, the only viable
141. See Bates & Starr Letter, supra note 28, at 56 (stating willingness of OIC to grant
formal or informal immunity).
142. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct 2037,2048 (2000).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The requirements will be onerous, particularly if courts follow the analysis of United
States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (opinion on rehearing). In that case, the District
of Columbia Circuit ruled that both prosecutors and witnesses must be shielded from exposure
to immunized testimony and emphasized that proof must be shown to be independent of
evidence indirectly derived from immunized testimony. Id. at 947.
146. Id.
147. Because documents contain written communications that are already fixed and fully
defined, an independent source for those same documents could eliminate the harm resulting
from a Fifth Amendment violation. By contrast, in United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), the testimony of live witnesses was at issue and was affected by exposure to tainted
testimony. In order to show lack of taint, the court of appeals required that the testimony have
been fixed or "canned" in advance of the illegality. Id. at 872. When documents are involved
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avenue for the prosecution is to establish that proof of existence is not testi-
monial because the fact of existence is a "foregone conclusion."
V The Implications of Hubbell
A. The Narrowing Reconstruction of Fisher
The Hubbell Court gave no indication that it was overruling any aspect
of Fisher. However, Fisher regarded the self-incrimination threat in docu-
ment production as quite limited and in light of Hubbell's rather broad con-
struction of the Fifth Amendment protections threatened by document produc-
tion, Hubbell should be interpreted as reformulating Fisher.
Fisher's atypical facts provide the basis for this reinterpretation of the
Fifth Amendment protections. Indeed, one of the interesting aspects of Hub-
bell is its characterization of the subpoenas and the state of the government's
knowledge in Fisher. The Hubbell Court made two relevant observations.
First, "Fisher involved summonses seeking production of working papers
prepared by the taxpayers' accountants that the IRS knew were in the posses-
sion of the taxpayers' attorneys." '48 In making its second observation, the
Court stated:
While inFisherthe Government already knew that the documents were in
the attorneys' possession and could independently confirm their existence
and authenticity throughthe accountants who created them, here the Gov-
ernment has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either the exis-
tence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately
produced by respondent. 9
The records in Fisher were documents given to the taxpayer defendants
and then transferred bythe defendants to their lawyers.' ° The government had
independent knowledge of the existence and location of the papers;"' and the
individuals who prepared documents could authenticate them.5 ' Regarding
existence, the government had clear knowledge of a group of transferred
documents.153 The defendants were not required to select the papers from a
larger category of their records. The documents sought were those that the
and alternative sources for the same documents are shown, producing an untainted "canned"
version of the evidence is virtually automatic.
148. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct 2037,2047 (2000).
149. Id. at 2048.
150. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,394 (1976).
151. Indeed, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion stated that the taxpayers stipulated that
the documents existed and were those described in the subpoena. Id. at 430 n.9 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
152. See 2 McCoPmacK ON EVIDENCE § 219 (5th ed. 1999) (describing simplest form of
authentication, which includes testimony of person preparing records).
153. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 430 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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accountants shipped to the defendants who then transferred them to their
attorneys." 4 The government knew the current location and could therefore
establish possession. The government's very complete knowledge in this
factually atypical case eliminated any real communication by response to the
subpoena. Thus, under Fisher's fact pattern, the Court could state accurately
that "[t]he question is not of testimony but of surrender.
1 55
Fisher now necessarily stands for a relatively narrow point in obtaining
documents from individuals by subpoena without violating the Fifth Amend-
ment. Rather, it should now be seen as a companion to, and minor exten-
sion of, the significant decisions rejecting Fourth Amendment limitations on
obtaining documents, espoused in Boyd. 56  isher stands for the proposition
that requiring the production of incriminating documents from a target does
not violate the Fifth Amendment if the government clearly establishes the
existence and location and if the production requires no selection by the
target.
Even afterHubbell's reformulation, Fisher's holding is byno means triv-
ial. A grand jury subpoena may force targets to surrender incriminating evi-
dence under compulsion, as long as new incriminating testimonial acts are not
required. 7 Moreover, even when the prosecution cannot obtain a search
warrant because it lacks probable cause regarding the incriminating quality or
relevance of the items sought, the prosecutor can obtain the evidence from a
target through a subpoena because a grand jury subpoena does not require
probable cause.'58 Despite the position of Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, that the Fifth Amendment should be understood to protect against com-
pelled production of evidence as well as testimony, at least this limited read-
ing of Fisher remains intact.
1 59
154. Id. at 394.
155. Id. at411 (quotingln re Harris, 221 U.S. 274,279 (1911)).'
156. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,634-35 (1886) (concluding that compulsory
production of private books can be unreasonable search and seizure within meaning of Fifth
Amendment); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Bcoya).
157. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (deciding that taking blood
sample from suspect did not involve communicative act and therefore did not violate Fifth
Amendment).
158. In this situation, probable cause would exist as to location, but not as to the import of
the evidence sought. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292,297-301 (1991) (ruling
that grand jury subpoena need not be justified on basis of probable cause and that, regarding
challenge based on relevancy grounds, "the motion to quash must be denied unless the district
court determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Govern-
ment seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investiga-
tion").
159. See United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2050-54 (2000) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (expressing view, based largely on reexamination of historical sources, that self-incrimina-
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Other aspects of the act of production doctrine remain undisturbed and
leave the doctrine as an important source of evidence for the prosecution.
When prosecutors issue subpoenas directed to corporations and other artificial
entities to which the Fifth Amendment provides no protection,"6 the Court has
ruled that custodians can be compelled to provide documents without regard
to the potential of those documents to incriminate the custodians personally.'61
Furthermore, both artificial entities and individuals must provide "required
records," regardless of their incriminating qualities. 162
Although the Court limited the doctrine's reach for individuals, the pre-
cise nature of the changes remain uncertain. We know the result at the two
ends of the spectrum, with Fisher occupying one extreme (all relevant facts
known by the government) and Hubbell the other (neither existence nor pos-
session known). In Hubbell, the prosecution did not show that it knew that the
documents existed, nor could it show that it knew that the target had posses-
sion of the documents, let alone that they had been there at the time the sub-
poena was served. Cases in the vast factual gulf between Fisher and Hubbell
are now without clear resolution. However, if the apparent implications of
Hubbell's language are followed, much greater protection will be afforded to
potential prosecution targets with respect to production of documents and
other tangible items than previously assumed.
B. A Broadening Emphasis in Theory ofFifth Amendment Violation
Although earlier decisions had acknowledged that the required produc-
tion of documents involved use of the target's mind or truthtelling, 63 Hubbell
put greater emphasis on this element than the other act of production opinions.
tion clause of Fifth Amendment was intended to cover compelled production of evidence as well
as testimony). See generally inffra Part V.F (discussing Justice Thomas's analysis).
160. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974) (ruling that artificial entities, such
as corporations, do not have Fifth Amendment privilege).
161. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 103-104 (1988) (reaffirming that long-
standing collective entities doctrine remained valid and unaffected by new analyses of document
production in Fisher and Doe 1). The Braswell Court, however, warned the government about
the problematic impact of granting use immunity to a custodian of such records if it anticipated
prosecuting the custodian. Id. at 117.
162. See, e.g., Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990) (assuming
production of child was testimonial and incriminating, requirement of production of child still
did not violate Fifth Amendment because mother assumed custodial duties under judicial super-
vision and therefore production was required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime not
governed by Fifth Amendment constraints); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1948)
(discussing inapplicability of Fifth Amendment to required records kept for public benefit and
public inspection).
163. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411(1976) (arguing that "[s]urely the Gov-
ernment is in no way relying on 'truthtelling' of the taxpayer").
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The Hubbell Court noted that "[i]t was only through respondent's truthful reply
to the subpoena that the government received the incriminating documents""
and "[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use
of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents
responsive to the requests in the subpoena." '165 By basing the decision on this
theoretical Fifth Amendment rhetoric, the Court appeared to be saying that
document production is to be part of, rather than separate from, the estab-
lished Fifth Amendment protections. Further, the Court appeared to be effec-
tively signaling an end to what practitioners and lawyers previously could
have viewed as a somewhat separate doctrinal treatment of subpoenas that
favored the prosecution."
As noted above, the unmistakable result of Hubbell is that, when the
government does not have knowledge of sources of incriminating information,
thus requiring the target to respond truthfully to a request to identify those
sources and to make use of.his or her mind, the prosecution's use of the
contents is a prohibited derivative use and a Fifth Amendment violation. An
intriguing question left unanswered by the opinion is whether this broad scope
of the privilege also prohibits use of contents beyond the situation where the
very existence of the documents is unknown.
164. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037,2047 (2000). On the importance of the
link between requiring truthtelling and finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment, the Court
relied on 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, JR., EVIDENCE § 2264, at 379 (John T. MeNaughton rev.
1961); Alito, supra note 6, at 47; and Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1228-29, 1256-59 (stating that
it is accepted universally that production of items in response to subpoena "relyng on [the
individual's] moral responsibilityfor truthtelling" may be resisted under Fifth Amendment).
165. Hubbell, 120S. Ct. at2047.
166. I argued earlier in this Article that the reckless and ill-advised litigation strategy of
the OIC helped produce the limitations on prosecutorial use of document subpoenas. See supra
notes 57-68 and accompanying text (arguing that lack of institutional constraints likely helped
cause OIC to use extreme tactics and arguments that proved unacceptable inquisitorial to the
Court). Although the personal impact of John Nields, Hubbell's attorney, may have been less
dramatic, his decision to couch his argument in this more protective rhetoric also undoubtedly
played an important role. Near the end of the argument the questioner was seeking guidance
from Nields on how to fashion a workable test for the "foregone conclusion" concept. Instead
of answering the specific question, he suggested a simpler and broader way to resolve the case:
But what I would suggest here is that- that this isn't the case to law down the exact
standard, only to say that the analysis has to be are you relying on the witness'
truth-telling to get the document. And if you are, it's testimony and the Fifth
Amendment applies. And if you only got an incriminating document because the
witness told the truth and you got it under immunity, you [must] hold the witness
harmless.
United States Supreme Court Transcript at 50, United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000)
(No. 99-166) [hereinafter Supreme Court Transcript]. In its most critical aspect, the Hubbell
opinion reflects Nields's suggestion.
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1. The Perceived Threat ofApproving the Hubbell Subpoena and the
Courts' Troubling Hypotheticals
If Hubbell results in a substantial re-interpretation of the previously
understood meaning of Fisher and broadly limits prosecutorial use of contents
after a grant of immunity, then the Supreme Court's selection of Fifth Amend-
ment rhetoric such as the "respondent's truthful reply" and the "contents of his
own mind" will play a critical role.'67 The OIC's reckless litigation strategy
likely played a role in the Court's selection of that broad rhetoric. It gave the
Court a fact pattern that threatened core Fifth Amendment sensibilities and
brought other intolerable inquisitorial images to mind. Without particular
knowledge of any crime, the OIC had subpoenaed from Hubbell virtually all
of his business related documents under a grant of use immunity. The OIC
sorted through those documents, discovered a crime, and then prosecuted
Hubbell based on evidence it obtained from the documents secured through
a grant of immunity. Moreover, the arguments offered by the OIC to defend
these practices did nothing to eliminate the potential of prosecutors using
these same techniques against others in the future.
Government lawyers, both from the OIC and the Department of Justice,
could not have been comforted by the hypothetical fact patterns that came
from the bench during the Hubbell litigation. The hypotheticals were reveal-
ing about the Justices' views and the troubling implications of these views.
The hypotheticals used weapons instead of documents because they are super-
ficially incriminating and thereby highlight the visceral element of the inquisi-
torial challenge to Fiflh Amendment protections. Beyond signaling the Court's
concern with the government's fundamental position, the hypotheticals may
also preview situations in which courts likely would find a Fifth Amendment
violation. Specifically, they suggest that requiring a target to disclose the
location of an object may violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
Questions regarding location could arise frequently, and if immunity were
required, any use of the items secured by the prosecution might be barred,
including the results of tests performed on them.
Hypothetical IA. If the government has no idea whether the target has
ever owned or possessed a gun, can it serve the target with a subpoena requir-
ing production of all guns in his or her possession, provide use immunity, and
then use the gun or guns obtained in any way at trial?"r
Hypothetical lB. Assume everyone knows that the target has a number
of guns in his house. 69 Without granting immunity, can the prosecutor, who
167. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. at 2047.
168. Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 166, at 14.
169. Id. at7,14. IntheDistrictCourtargument, thishypotheticalinvolved shoesratherthan
guns and made reference to the prosecutor's effort in the OJ. Simpson case to prove that Simpson
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is interested in a particular gun used in a specific crime, demand through a
subpoena that the target produce all guns that are in his house because the
target's possession of some guns is a well known fact and therefore arguably
a "foregone conclusion"?
The first hypothetical models a rough version of the Hubbell case itself.
The government's "manna from heaven" response applies to this situation and
would allow it to use any ballistics or other scientific evidence derived from
testing the gun (equivalent to contents) to prosecute the target.
The second hypothetical poses the problem of items identified only by
general classification instead of by individual item within that classification.
The target is known to possess guns (equivalent to business records), but it is
a particular gun of yet unidentified characteristics that the prosecution seeks
by the subpoena. The existence of "each and every" or "all" guns is not a
"foregone conclusion." This subpoena requires the target to identify, assem-
ble, and select the items from a generally described class. The prosecution
narrowed the selection process somewhat since a relatively specific category,
guns, is identified. However, the prosecution does not know of the existence
of any particular gun. This hypothetical reveals several of the issues that
should be resolved by the "reasonable particularity" test or other formulation
designed to determine whether the communicated information is a "foregone
conclusion."
Hypothetical 1C. Instead of either of the above descriptions, the sub-
poena requires delivery of a precisely described .38 caliber Smith & Wesson
revolver with ivory handles and a "K" carved into one of those handles. 10
The specific description of the gun in the subpoena would both solve the
problem of selection and eliminate the issue of existence if a prosecution
witness knows that the target had such a weapon. A highly particular descrip-
tion eliminates the problem of the target being required to assemble the items
from a generically defined class. The communication eliminated bythis highly
particular description suggests that the government must not only describe the
class, but it must also know specifically that the particular item or items in that
class exist. I suggest that in addition to a subpoena containing a precise de-
scription of the item to be delivered (such as the revolver with a "K" carved in
its handle), a subpoena should be sufficient if it clearly identifies the "con-
tainer" in which the items are located, such as all canceled checks received in
an envelope from Bank of America postmarked in August 2000.
owned a specific brand of shoes (Bruno Magli), whose soles produced the bloody footprints at
the scene of the double murder. C.W. Griffm, Dubious Experts, WASa. PosT, Jan. 11, 1999, at
A.19. The court considered whether a subpoena that required Simpson either to turn over all his
shoes or the full contents of his closet would have been lawful. Motions Hearing Transcript,
supra note 26, at 81-82 (presenting argument of John Nields and colloquy with court).
170. Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 166, at 14.
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If the prosecutor specifically designated a container of items and estab-
lished its existence as a "foregone conclusion," several issues have been
eliminated. However, other issues remain. The prosecutor has not shown the
continued existence and the target's present possession of any or all members
of the items in that container, such as particular canceled checks. If this is
required, it may prove highly problematic to the prosecution.
Hypothetical 2. In a murder case, the prosecution has recovered the
bullet that caused death, and it also knows that the defendant bought a gun of
the same caliber because he purchased it in a state where all handguns are
registered upon purchase. A subpoena demanding production of the gun is
served on the defendant. Once the prosecution has control of the gun, it will
perform forensic tests under the assumption that a bullet from that gun can be
matched with the relatively intact and unmarred slug taken from the victim's
body.1
71
This hypothetical begins to raise questions about the temporal compo-
nents of knowledge of existence and location, and about the significance of
lack of current knowledge regarding them. It also introduces questions of
what legal use may be made of a detailed examination of the contents of the
item produced, which might be considered an indirect use of the act of pro-
duction. Is the existence of the gun a "foregone conclusion" because of the
unchallengeable, but dated, registration information? If no one has seen the
gun in the past few months so that the target may continue to possess it or may
have hidden or destroyed it, is possession a "foregone conclusion" so that
production is not testimonially communicative? If possession remains testi-
monial, use immunity is granted, and the prosecutor does not offer any evi-
dence regarding recovery of the gun from the target's possession at trial, may
the test results (contents) and the already known information that the target
once owned this gun be introduced?"
2
171. The Supreme Court asked a form of this hypothetical question during oral argument
See id. at 8. The question also included the fact that the gun had been hidden. Id. at 9. The
hypothetical may have had its origins in comments by the OIC lawyer during the district court
argument on Hubbell's motion to dismiss the indictment The OIC attorney described a civil
rights prosecution in federal district court in Maryland, which ended in a guilty plea and without
a published opinion. Motions Hearing Transcript, supra note 26, at 98. In that case, the OIC
asked a police officer to surrender all guns he was carrying on the night of the shooting, and the
prosecutor had the serial numbers of those guns. Id. Upon production of a gun, tests were
conducted, and the gun was linked to the shooting. Id. OIC counsel claimed, but provided no
documentation, that this type of immunity was used frequently in courtrooms all across the
country. Id.
172. Although not responding to precisely this hypothetical, the OIC's argument with
respect to forcing the target to produce the gun was that the court could force the targetto produce
the weapon, but could not force him to state in actual testimony where the gun is located. Su-
preme Court Transcript, supra note 166, at 10-11. Again not referring to this particular gun
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Hypothetical 3. The suspected murderer showed a distinctive and easily
describable gun (a .38 caliber revolver with the letter "K" carved on one of its
ivory handles) to a witness and then fled to a cabin in some nearby woods
where he was surrounded and captured. The prosecution thus knows that the
gun still exists and that it must be somewhere in the cabin or in the adjacent
woods, but the prosecution has been unable to find it.7 3 Because the gun's
existence is a "foregone conclusion" as is possession during the chase, can the
target be required by subpoena to produce the gun without a grant of immu-
nity?
Hypothetical 3 highlights an intuitive concern that revealing location,
when that fact is unknown to the prosecution, constitutes important incrimi-
nating information. It also demonstrates how easily such a question can arise.
Even if revealing location is considered testimonial under these circum-
stances, the government may still have alternative ways to prove its case.
Because only possession is testimonial, would granting use immunity result
in the exclusion of only evidence of possession? Or, would granting use
immunity also result in the exclusion of evidence regarding the gun's serial
numbers and scientific tests conducted on it (the equivalent of contents) that
might help prove that the defendant purchased the weapon and used it to
commit the murder?
Hypothetical 4. A murder suspect is granted immunity and compelled to
incriminate himself verbally. Under compulsion, he is asked to reveal the
whereabouts of the murder weapon. The prosecution concedes that it would
not have discovered the weapon where the suspect buried it. As a result of his
information, police recover the knife, and scientific tests reveal the defen-
dant's fingerprints and the victim's blood on the knife.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals used a similar hypothetical
in its opinion. The court thought that oral testimony and the evidence derived
from it - such as the weapon and all evidence from its examination - could
not be used against the defendant. It found no basis for distinguishing be-
tween verbal statements and implicit testimony given by acts or verbal state-
ments,'74 and therefore would attribute the same consequences to compelled
hypothetical but to a similar one, counsel for the Department of Justice believed that a court could
compel the production of a weapon. However, the counsel expressed some concern in such a
situation about meeting the requirement that the government prove that in developing the
evidence no investigative leads or focus on the target resulting from the disclosure were used.
Id. at 22-23.
173. Id. at 48 (presenting question asked to Nields). Perhaps the initial elements of what
became this hypothetical ("He's hidden the gun somewhere.") were posed first to the OIC's
lawyer. Id. at 9.
174. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 2037
(2000). The court of appeals cited and quoted from Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988)
526
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production of the weapon by subpoena.'15 Notably, possession or location is
the only testimonial act involved in this hypothetical, which strongly suggests
that the court of appeals believed that revealing location through an act of
production would be sufficient to warrant suppression of the "contents" ofthe
object.
Hypothetical 5. A murder victim's body is found in the basement of a
large apartment building, and an autopsy establishes stabbing as the cause of
death. The prosecution serves a subpoena on every resident of the building
requiring them to produce all knives and other forms of cutlery that are now,
or in the preceding month have been, in their possession or control." 6 An
objection is made on Fifth Amendment grounds, and use immunity is granted.
The residents of the building produced a quantity of knives. Upon testing, the
victim's blood and a resident's fingerprint are on one knife.' 7
This hypothetical presents a case where the government lacks knowledge
of the existence of individual items within a broad category, while not raising
the question of whether the court should impose rigid requirements of imme-
diate knowledge of existence and location. Like some of the earlier hypo-
theticals and the Hubbell facts, I believe the courts clearly should resolve the
legal issues against the prosecution because the hypothetical offends anti-
inquisitorial values. As a result, the court would exclude evidence obtained
from the examination ofthe unknown knives as inconsistent with the privilege
against self-incrimination and use immunity.
To this point, the incrimination issue has been ignored. Possession of the
item in this hypothetical, a weapon, would be incriminating even under the
narrow analysis used by Fisher. This would not be true for many documents.
[hereinafter Doe R1] in making this argument. In Doe I, the Court stated "These principles
[regarding testimonial self-incrimination] were articulated in general terms, not as confined acts.
Petitioner has articulated no cogent argument as to why the 'testimonial' requirement should
have one meaning in the context of acts, and another meaning in the context of statements."
Id. at 210 n.8.
As noted supra note 172, the OIC nevertheless contended during oral argument in the
Supreme Court that, while it could compel production of items whose location was not known,
it could not require the target to disclose the unknown location through actual testimony. The
argument that the Court could draw either a sharp distinction or some difference in treatment
between compelling explicit speech and indirect communication through the act of production
under the Fifth Amendment, was apparently rejected by Doe H, but, in fairness, the Court has
not carefully examined the possible distinction. See also infra note 179 and accompanying text
(opposing drawing of distinction between acts and verbal statements for purpose of determining
incrimination).
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Hypothetical 6. A murder suspect is known by his spouse to keep a diary
in a specifically described green notebook with unique writing on the front.
The suspect possessed the diary in his home within an hour (or a day or a week)
of the time he was served with a subpoena describing the diary in precise detail
and demanding its production.'78 Does the production of the diary constitute
testimonial incrimination?
Hypothetical 6 moves us out of the realm of superficially incriminating
weapons, but the precise description used and the prosecution's clear knowl-
edge of existence eliminates a number of frequently encountered problems.
Under these facts, are existence and possession a "foregone conclusion," so
that production of the diary would entail testimonial comunuication and
therefore require a grant of immunity? Even if possession is not a "foregone
conclusion," is the Fifth Amendment nevertheless inapplicable because pos-
session of a person's own diary is not incriminating without reference to its
content? Assume that use immunity is granted only because possession is the
communicative element. Can the contents of the diary, which reveal a motive
for the murder, be introduced after use immunity has been granted if nothing
about the target's possession of the diary is shown at trial?
The above hypotheticals raise a range of problems regarding subpoenas
for incriminating evidence. I believe that an analysis of these hypotheticals
under reasonably clear principles reveals a number of significant conclusions
and highlight some remaining, unresolved issues. I will summarize these.
1. The facts of Fisher do not raise the problems discussed above, be-
cause existence and possession were "foregone conclusions" under any rea-
sonable definition, and no selection within a generally defined class was
required.
2. The hypotheticals highlight the extreme nature of the government's
"manna from heaven" argument. In all but Hypothetical 4, that argument
allows the court to order production under a grant of immunity while allowing
the prosecution to use the "contents."
3. Hypothetical lB illustrates one of the reasons for a "reasonable par-
ticularity" requirement. Such a requirement would prevent the government
from using a generic category to establish a "foregone conclusion" when it
knows that the target has some items in the class, but does not know of the
existence (or afortiori possession) of the particular item of interest.
4. Hypothetical 4 suggests that there should be no distinction between
requiring production of an item and asking the target under compulsion to
178. This hypothetical question differs from the others in that it was not used in any of the
arguments in the Hubbell case, but is instead of my formulation. See Mosteller, supra note 6,
at 13 (arguing that when subpoena describes item to be produced with such particularity that
uninformed third party could satisfy its demand, compliance is non-testimonial).
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state whether the item exists and where it is located. Language from Doe HII
certainly suggests that the court of appeals was correct in concluding that no
distinction should be drawn. Because the Supreme Court has never exten-
sively examined the issue, some possibility remains that it may develop an
important difference in treatment between compulsion of testimony per se and
compulsion of implicit testimony through production. However, any such
distinction would be very difficult to justify under established Fifth Amend-
ment doctrine. If, in the end, requiring a target to disclose location through
production is as fully protected as requiring such a revelation through oral
testimony, the implications are substantial.
5. Examination ofthe hypotheticals as a group suggests that, as to easily
moved or hidden items, existence is easier to establish as a "foregone conclu-
sion" than is possession, and as to readily destructible items, knowledge of
existence at one point does not guarantee its continued existence. Either the
definition of a "foregone conclusion" must be variable and require less exacti-
tude when possession is at issue, or eliminating the testimonial element in
showing the target's possession will prove difficult. If not, another limiting
mechanism, such as a rule governing when possession can incriminate, must
be developed if subpoenas are to remain a viable tool for production of readily
mobile items from targets.
6. If "respondent's truthful response" and "contents of his own mind" are
the touchstones of a Fifth Amendment violation, then possession as to easily
disposable or concealed items, such as individual papers, may be difficult to
establish as a "foregone conclusion." Such items could not be obtained
through a subpoena consistent with the Fifth Amendment unless the prosecu-
tion grants immunity, limiting the direct and indirect use of the item.
7. If possession is frequently found to be testimonial, then pressure may
be placed on the interpretation of the incrimination requirement because, for
many documents, a finding that possession is not incriminating could be the
only generally available way to avoid the protections of the Fifth Amendment
and the potentially heavy burdens of use immunity.
8. By indicating that the incriminating nature of their contents does not
count in determining whether possession of documents is incrimination,"'0
Fisher suggests the incrimination component of the doctrine should be nar-
rowly applied to most documents.' By contrast, items such as contraband
179. See Doe 17, 487 U.S. at 210 n.8 (stating that "Petitioner has articulated no cogent
argument as to why the 'testimonial' requirement should have one meaning in the context of
acts and another meaning in the context of verbal statements").
180. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,411 (1976).
181. In its opinion, the court of appeals construed the incriminating effect of possession of
business documents quite broadly. It suggested that possession of an interest bearing checking
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and weapons satisfy the incrimination without a detailed examination of their
"contents" because possession is itself illegal or often highly incriminating.
Fisher's perspective provides a possible basis for different treatment of pos-
session of documents (relatively indirect incrimination) and guns (relatively
direct incrimination) that arises though the act of producing these items.
Whether such a distinction should or does survive Hubbell is unclear.
9. If the incrimination component is satisfied, then production would
appear to require a grant of use immunity if the item's whereabouts are un-
known to the prosecution. In that situation, use of the item's contents would
appear to be derivative of a constitutional violation and therefore prohibited.
A court motivated to avoid exclusion of the evidence must develop a theory
to distinguish establishing existence from proving possession (or where-
abouts) with respect to the prohibition against derivative use. This distinction
may prove difficult to make.
10. The fact that failure to produce items known to exist and to recently
have been in the individual's possession will result in an inference of guilt
serves as a practical limitation on both the usefulness of Fifth Amendment
protection to the target and its cost to the prosecution. The failure of the
target to account for an obviously suspicious item shown to have been re-
cently in her possession will have an incriminating effect without any explicit
refusal to produce or an admission by the target that the item is no longer
available. By contrast, the absence of items that are superficially innocuous
or not in fact known to exist will not normally have an incriminating effect,
because no explanation regarding the item would be logically expected. 82
Nevertheless, the prosecution cannot constitutionally compel the target to
state specifically that he or she no longer possesses an item, 83 nor can it use
the compelled answer regarding such destruction when use immunity has been
granted.
account would be incriminating by helping to eliminate a defense of lack ofknowledge. Hubbell,
167 F.3d at 582. Such an interpretation appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court's analysis
ofthe incrimination issue inFisher. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412. See generally infra Part V.D.
182. Cf. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDMENCE § 264 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing missing evidence
inference).
183. The "Definitions and Instructions" that accompanied the subpoena delivered to Hub-
bell required that if any document demanded in the subpoena has been "lost, destroyed, deleted,
altered, or otherwise disposed of," the target must, inter alia, describe the subject matter of the
document and explain the circumstances and the reasons for its loss, destruction, deleting, etc.
Joint App., supra note 38, at 53. Given the grant of immunity that accompanied the subpoena,
this requirement is understandable, but use immunity should prevent the government from using
the explicit testimonial response that the item was destroyed. Requiring an explicit explanation
would seem to pose problems for the prosecution of the target for that destruction, absent
careful and effective screening of that prosecution from the statement.
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2. The Distinctions Between Do or Did Possess and Do or Did Exist
The hypotheticals posed in the Hubbell litigation present the question of
whether, to establish a "foregone conclusion," the government must show that
at the time the subpoena was served the items still existed and were at an iden-
tifiable location. Instead, could the government merely prove that the items did
exist at some reasonably recent date and were, at that or another earlier time,
in the target's possession? 84 Fisher did not examine temporal issues at all
because the government knew the records at issue were held by specified third
parties. However, prosecutors have a difficult time showing present existence
and possession when easily concealed or readily destructible evidence is
believed to be in the target's possession or control. Hubbell also did not deal
with the temporal question, but for the quite different reason that the govern-
ment could not show knowledge of existence ofthe documents at any time.
The prosecution frequently may have evidence that establishes an item's
existence and the target's possession at some time in the past. As to many
items, continued existence may also be logically inferred, but a reasonable
inference is not the same as a "foregone conclusion" as to existence, let alone
a "foregone conclusion" of the item's present location. If the function of the
"foregone conclusion' concept is to eliminate, not simply to reduce, then the
communicative aspect of production under the theory that the prosecutor
already knows the information, simply a reasonable inference of continued
existence and possession often will not prove sufficient. However, the lower
courts do not appear to use a rigorous standard, where, for example, posses-
sion of a set of documents was found to be a "foregone conclusion" because
the documents were known to be in the target's hands nine weeks earlier."'
That evidence might be satisfactory to establish probable cause, but it should
not be sufficient to establish current possession as a "foregone conclusion."
The acts of hiding or destroying evidence may be criminalized, or an
inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from failure to account for the
evidence. These mechanisms would reduce the benefits atarget would receive
184. Some lower court opinions do require a showing that the items are presently in the
target's possession, see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, August 1986, 658 F.
Supp. 474,482 (D. Md. 1987), and set the time the subpoena is served as the relevant time for
possession. United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1493 (8th Cir. 1987). Others seem to ignore
the temporal issue.
185. Rue, 819 F.2d at 1493. The court gives some reasons to believe the documents were
not moved and their possession was in fact a "foregone conclusion" after nine weeks - "the
nature of the documents, the nature of the business to which the documents pertained, [and] the
absence of any indication that the documents were transferred to someone else or were de-
stroyed." Id. These factors make the claim plausible that possession was established, but in my
judgment the evidence would not satisfiy the "foregone conclusion" standard with the specificity
that terminology connotes.
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from hiding or destroying evidence when prosecutors can establish the exis-
tence of the item and the target's possession of it in the recent past. However,
it is unclear whether, under existing Fifth Amendment theory, the target's
actions of concealing or destroying evidence before production is ordered can
eliminate the protection against compulsory self-incrimination. Also, there are
no obvious alternatives to using the serving of the subpoena as the time when
concealment or destruction voids Fifth Amendment protection.' 6 Whether the
Fifth Amendment should draw a distinction between hiding and destroying evi-
dence is even less clear." 7
C. The Significance of Forced Disclosure of Possession ofDocuments
or Tangible Items
1. Testimonial Aspect of Possession
On many of the occasions when the Hubbell opinion mentioned that the
government learned of the existence of the documents through use of the mind
or truthtelling, it linked existence with a second factor - "location" or "where-
abouts."'88 As noted earlier, the implications of Hubbell are potentially quite
far-reaching if the Court meant to treat the government's lack of knowledge
of location as having the same impact as lack of knowledge of existence with
respect to use of a document's contents."8 9
186. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing timing of government's knowl-
edge of subpoenaed items as it relates to foregone conclusion doctrine). The time the subpoena
is served appears to be the critical point for application of the "foregone conclusion" doctrine.
187. Unless a target hides an item by tossing it into a deep body of water, for example, a
target can still retrieve and produce the item if it is hidden rather than destroyed. As a result,
a truthful response to the demand for production of many hidden items will be delivery of the
item. Thus, the options for the target are: (1) to be truthful and to incriminate, (2) to lie, or
(3) to refuse to produce and be held in contempt Destruction or its equivalent ("deep sixing"
in the Potomac River) means that, without direct adverse consequences, the defendant may
answer truthfully that he or she does not possess the item and cannot produce it. As a result,
if use immunity prevents use of answers that the item no longer exists, destruction would entail
less direct punishment to the target than hiding it, which seems a misguided result.
If the Fifth Amendment were freely malleable, a policy driven formulation of it would
most strongly discourage destruction of evidence. See Stunlz, supra note 6, at 1256-57, 1279
(arguing that law discourages destruction of evidence, as opposed to failure to readily disclose
incriminating evidence, and that much of Fifth Amendment doctrine may be explained by law's
tendency to excuse defendant's actions that are more understandable and less culpable than
evidence destruction). Such purely policy driven analysis also would provide some justification
for sanctions that discourage destroying and/or hiding evidence even before the subpoena is
served, with sanctions increasing as the investigation progresses. However, the place of such
variable sanctions within the developed Fifth Amendment doctrine is quite uncertain.
188. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct 2037,2048 (2000).
189. Lack ofknowledge of existence means afortiori that the government lacks knowledge
of location or whereabouts. If one has no information that an item exists, knowledge that the
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The practical factual problem is quite substantial. In situations involving
readily mobile objects, typical knowledge of existence will not constitute
knowledge of location. Indeed, for readily destructible items, such as specific
documents, the government's abundant knowledge that they existed at some
point neither proves the continued existence of the critical documents nor
establishes their current location."9 Avoiding a Fifth Amendment violation
frequently may prove difficult if the Hubbell Court meant that in order to use
the contents of documents, the government must demonstrate knowledge of
continued existence and knowledge of present location in addition to knowl-
edge of existence at an historical time. Perhaps instead, the Hubbell Court
may have meant to assert, or will assert in the future, that use of a document
is a fruit only of lack of knowledge of the subpoenaed item's existence at
some relevant time, such as during the investigation. However, nothing in the
opinion supports an interpretation that eliminates entirely the significance of
knowledge of whereabouts of the document when the issue is the use of
contents of documents. The opinion also does not support an interpretation
which would allow substantial latitude as to the time when knowledge of the
whereabouts must be shown.
Instead, I wantto make a different assumption and explore the possibility
that using the contents of a document violates the privilege against self-
incrimination unless the government establishes that it had both knowledge
of the document's existence and its location at the time the subpoena was
served (or issued). Moving in this direction has intuitive appeal in that it
encourages applying related tests to meet Fourth and Fifth Amendment
objections.
191
item is in anyone's possession is necessarily absent The court of appeals expressed this
observation when it stated that the government had no knowledge of "actual existence, let alone
their possession by the subpoenaed party." United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 585 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000). Thus, when the Supreme Court spoke of lack of
knowledge of possession associated with lack of knowledge of existence, it necessarily was true
in a case where the government lacked knowledge of the very existence of the documents. The
opposite, however, is not true. Knowledge of existence does not mean that the government will
have knowledge of location, particularly present location in the possession or control of the
target Also, lack of knowledge of location does not necessarily mean that existence (at least
at some time in the past) is unknown.
190. The problem of showing present knowledge may be particularly acute as to specific
items in a class. Knowledge regarding a critical document often will only relate to the existence
of the class, and showing the continued existence and precise location of specific items in that
class may prove particularly difficult.
191. The revised shape of the act of production doctrine suggested in this Article does not
reinstate Boyd because private documents would still be given no special protections when
seized under authorization of the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment would still
allow law enforcement officials to require targets to surrender incriminating documents.
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2 Relationship to Probable Cause
Grand juries may issue subpoenas for evidence on less than probable
cause.1" The use of a lower standard can be justified in several ways. One,
which may be largely unappreciated by targets, is that a subpoena does not
require government entry into private space to conduct a search for the evi-
dence. Instead, the government asked the target to produce the item through
his or her own efforts. 193  As a result, Fourth Amendment violations are
avoided both for targets and for innocent third parties whose homes and bus-
inesses might have otherwise been subjected to an intrusive search. However,
from the target's perspective, being required to reveal the contents of the mind
may be as substantively intrusive as a search of private space, albeit an in-
trusion upon a different constitutional right. One remedy would be to require
probable cause for compelling production of evidence from a target, but this
result would require radical remaking of grand jury doctrine.194 Another
justification for a standard lower than probable cause to secure items for the
grand jury arises from the purpose of the grand jury. Because the purpose of
the grand jury is to establish probable cause at the end of its work, requiring
probable cause as to each subpoena would be illogical and self-defeating.19
Although the required showing to establish a "foregone conclusion" to
eliminate the testimonial element of production under a subpoena is more
However, the altered doctrine is similar to Boyd's sentiment that the protections under the
Fourth and FifthAmendment move toward each otherwhen the target produces items. Cf Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886) ("In this regard the fourth and fifth amendments run
almost into each other.").
192. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292,297 (1991) (discussing standard
for issuance of grand jury subpoena).
193. The district court in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), noted two advantages of subpoenas over search warrants for third
parties - lesser intrusion and ability to challenge subpoena before the intrusion occurs:
It should be apparent that means less drastic than a search warrant do exist for
obtaining materials in possession of a third party. A subpoena duces tecum, ob-
viously, is much less intrusive than a search warrant the police do not go rummag-
ing through one's home, office, or desk if armed only with a subpoena. And, per-
haps equally important, there is no opportunity to challenge the search warrant prior
to the intrusion, whereas one can always move to quash the subpoena before produc-
ing the sought-after materials. This procedural difference is important Mistakes in
the issuance of a warrant or subpoena have occurred; motions to suppress and
motions to quash are not uncommon. In view ofthe difference in degree ofintrusion
and opportunity to challenge possible mistakes, the subpoena should always be
preferred to a search warrant, for non-suspects.
Id. at 130.
194. Such a decision would indeed return the state of the law to that espoused in Boyd.
195. See R Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. at 297 (discussing role of grand jury).
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onerous than probable cause, the showing required to establish probable cause
is more demanding than imposed for issuance of a grand jury subpoena. The
latter standard is merely that the subpoenaed evidence has some likely rele-
vance to the grand jury's investigation. Therefore, while applying a probable
cause standard, as opposed to the more onerous "foregone conclusion" show-
ing, might be seen as a move in the right direction, applying the probable
cause standard generally to subpoenas when targets are involved would still
impose significant limitations on the issuance of subpoenas. The change also
would conflict with a substantial body ofprecedent. For these reasons, adopt-
ing a probable cause standard is an unlikely solution to any remaining prob-
lems with subpoenas for evidence from targets.
Although the probable cause standard is too demanding for application
to all elements of subpoenas, it is too lax to eliminate Fifth Amendment pro-
tections. The ability to make out probable cause and, therefore, to obtain a
search warrant is not equivalent to meeting the "foregone conclusion" require-
ment. As developed earlier,196 the "foregone conclusion" concept eliminates
the testimonial element ofthe act of production. For this purpose, the govern-
ment must know the fact with such certainty that it is uninterested in the
implicit testimony given through the act of production. The terminology
"foregone conclusion" suggests a more onerous showing than probable cause,
and, in Fifth Amendment theory, the more demanding standard should be
required.
97
Alternatively, if the government could show that it had adequate knowl-
edge of the existence and location of evidence tending to prove a crime, that
knowledge would have been sufficient to obtain a search warrant and allowed
the government to secure the items through a search. Under the "inevitable
discovery" doctrine, such a showing could establish an independent source for
the items and their contents, and, therefore, use immunity would not be vio-
196. See infra Part DlI.D (developing theoxy and function of "foregone conclusion" con-
cept).
197. Although no remedy may be available for a Fifth Amendment violation where the
evidence was or could have been obtained through an independent source, the lack of a remedy
does not mean that the constitutional violation never occurred. By contrast, when the prosecu-
tion establishes "foregone conclusion," it eliminates the constitutional violation, and greater
knowledge than probable cause should be required for that purpose.
On the other hand, while the existence of full fledged probable cause does not eliminate
the violation, it may render that violation harmless through the concept of inevitable discovery.
Because the incrimination is contained in a fixed document, proof that the same document
would have been discovered through a lawful search eliminates the full effect of the constitu-
tional violation. When it is oral testimony that was tainted it is often not possible to eliminate
the full effect of the constitutional violation in a similar manner. See United States v. North,
910 F.2d 843, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (ruling that lack of taint could be established where evi-
dence is fixed or "canned" before immunized testimony was received).
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lated.195 Thus, where the government can show that it knows of the existence
and present location of potentially incriminating items, it can establish an
independent source for the evidence. However, that alternative has limited
usefulness in avoiding the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment because, as
noted above, grand jury subpoenas do not require a showing of probable cause
that the evidence sought is evidence of a crime."9 Moreover, the information
required to make such a showing often will be unavailable.
Further, a showing of knowledge of present existence and current loca-
tion of an item sufficient to show probable cause often will be inadequate to
establish an independent source. In this context, a prosecutor would establish
an independent source through the "inevitable discovery" concept, which
would require not only probable cause, but also a showing that the police
would have found the evidence when they executed the search warrant. When
an item is discovered by a warrantless search, all that is lacking to prove
inevitable discovery is a showing that the police had sufficient evidence to
obtain a search warrant and would have obtained it.2  By contrast, when the
198. The Supreme Court first recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix v. Wil-
liams, 467 U.S. 431,450 (1984). In that case, the Court concluded that evidence should not be
excluded even when it was discovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation if the
evidence inevitably would have been discovered by alternative, legally proper means. Id. at 448.
Although the "inevitable discovery" doctrine is functionally similar to the "independent source"
concept, it differs in that when "inevitable discovery" is involved the discovery through inde-
pendent means is hypothetical rather than actual. Id. at 443-44. The "inevitable discovery"
doctrine eliminates the need to prove that no use or derivative use was made of documents where
those documents would clearly have been discovered through means lawful under the Fourth
Amendment Moreover, the doctrine imposes no special burden of proof, only a preponderance
of the evidence standard applies. Id. at 444.
199. The Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause must be established not only for
location but also for a connection between some criminal activity and the items sought. See 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEzuRE § 3.1(b), at 6-8 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Comment,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CBL L.
REV. 664,687 (1961)).
200. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539-44 (1988) (developing requirements
of inevitable discovery in context of warrantless seizure of evidence). The Court ruled the
evidence admissible when a warrant was later obtained because the pre-existing probable cause
provided a basis in the independent sourcefinevitable doctrines for its lawful acquisition. Id.
at 537-44. In applying the independent sourcemevitable doctrines, the Court was not required
to speculate whether the evidence would have been found through a search because, in fact, it
had been found through a search.
Perhaps where probable cause exists, courts should require that the prosecution first
attempt to secure the evidence through a search warrant because of its clarifying effect on
whether the evidence could be obtained through alternative means. However, outside of a few
specifically protected interests, such as the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
generally has avoided imposing preferences among constitutionally permissible courses of
action, and it particularly has avoided imposition of a such a "least restrictive alternative"
analysis in its Fourth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
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target produces an item in response to a subpoena, production does not show
that an officer would have found the item through a search. On the other
hand, if location were truly a "foregone conclusion, the requisite showing of
immediate knowledge of the item's whereabouts necessarily would mean that
a search would have been successful. Thus, in a number of situations, Fourth
and Fifth Amendment requirements may move toward each other, but they do
not merge.
3. A Continuing Uncertainty About Hubbell's Impact on Significance of
Whereabouts ofDocuments
Hubbell significantly changed the act of production doctrine if the Court
meant to say that when the target's truthtelling is required to reveal the current
location of any subpoenaed item, the use of the item is a fruit of a Fifth
Amendment violation and, therefore, those contents are off limits to the
prosecution whether or not use immunity is granted. The question remains,
however, is this the correct interpretation of Hubbell?
On the one hand, no easy stopping points immediately reveal themselves
short ofthis conclusion. Perhaps the Courtmeantto accomplishthis result, but
it did not explicitly state such a radical outcome. In one description of what it
intended to allow, the Court drew a distinction between 'telling an inquisitor
the combination to a wall safe," which it indicated is forbidden under the Fifth
Amendment, and "being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox," which is
allowed. 201 The Court did not indicate that the target only needed to surrender
543, 556 n.12 (1976) (concluding that possibility that alternatives to border checkpoints could
stem flow of illegal aliens should not be considered in determining whether checkpoints were
constitutional and that such approach would invalidate most search and seizure procedures).
Where the police attempt a search and fail, both the inevitable discovery argument and the
"foregone conclusion" position are left in ruins. As a result, the government may be discouraged
from taking the search-first approach. On the other hand, the prosecution may, nevertheless, be
persuaded to adopt a search-first policy because criminals predictably will not respond honestly
to a subpoena request if a viable alternative exists. Unlike a subpoena, a search does not depend
on the target's cooperation.
Establishing inevitability of discovery through a search would be quite simple if a rigorous
formulation of the "foregone conclusion" concept, rather than probable cause, were required for
possession of the evidence. The same showing that would establish knowledge of location also
would establish that probable cause existed. Ifthe item was produced in response to a subpoena,
from the location specified in the subpoena, then a court can assume that the police would have
found it through a search of that same location. If the target produced the item, he or she will
have demonstrated that until the moment of service of the subpoena the document had not been
moved or destroyed, fixing the item's location at that moment There could, therefore, be no
harm to the target's interests in proceeding by subpoena rather than a search.
201. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2047 (2000) (observing that because
respondent had to use "the contents of his own mind" to select documents for production, deriva-
tive use of produced documents was precluded by grant of immunity).
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV 487 (2001)
the key to the strongbox if it could have been obtained by a search warrant
because its continued existence and present location were known. "Surrender"
could be so interpreted, and those rigid requirements were met in Schmerber
v. California, in which the Court approved the taking of the target's blood. 2
While "surrender" may be given this restricted meaning, that interpretation is
not inevitable. Whether the Court intended to narrow the effective scope of
subpoenas for evidence directed to targets remains uncertain.
D. Possession and Incrimination
If the Court's analysis in Hubbell depends solely on whether the target's
truthtelling is required to comply with the subpoena, then the Court would be
significantly revising the requirements of incrimination as set out in Fisher.
As noted earlier, a Fifth Amendment violation requires compulsion, which is
automatically provided by the subpoena, and two additional components: a
testimonial act and potential incrimination. 2 3 The act of producing the item
may be testimonial in that it shows that the target had possession or access to
the item. However, is the act of producing an item potentially incriminating?
In Fisher, the Court concluded that the act of production was neither
testimonial nor incriminating.2 4 The Court decided the act was not testimo-
nial because both existence and possession were a "foregone conclusion."0 '
With regard to incrimination, the Court stated:
[S]urelyitis not illegal to seek accounting help in connectionwith one'stax
returns orfor the accountant to prepare workpapers and deliver them to the
taxpayer. At this juncture, we are quite unprepared to hold that either the
fact of existence of the papers or of their possession by the taxpayer poses
any realistic threat of incrimination to the taxpayer.'
The Fisher Court construed incrimination narrowly and did not consider the
papers potentially incriminating contents in determining whether the act of
production incriminated the target."° I previously have argued that such a
narrow analysis of incrimination, one which excludes the document's contents
from consideration, does not withstand logical analysis when applied to an
202. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (holding that incriminating, com-
pulsory blood test evidence was neither testimonial nor evidence related to communicative act
and, therefore, was not barred on Fifth Amendment grounds).
203. See infra Part BIA-nLC (describing three requirements of Fifth Amendment violation
in context of complying with subpoena duces tecum).
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act of production that establishes the existence of incriminating documents of
which the government was unaware.208
In Doe I, the Supreme Court reached a different result than Fisher regard-
ing whether the production of business documents involved testimonial self-
incrimination." 9 The Hubbell holding that the production of subpoenaed
documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination clearly adopts Doe I's
answer to the question of whether the production of documents unknown to
the government is testimonial.210 Hubbell implicitly reaffirms that such an act
is incriminating, a result that must rest on the incriminating quality of the
contents of the documents. The question remains whether the Doe land Hub-
bell opinions likewise establish that the contents of the subpoenaed documents
may be examined to determine whether the act of production contains incrimi-
nating evidence regarding possession, location, or whereabouts.
I have previously argued that it is sensible to consider the incrimination
component more narrowly when examining an act that demonstrates posses-
sion as opposed to one that establishes knowledge. In the latter situation
(existence), the government's only knowledge of the document is as a result
of the target's response to a subpoena. Any use of the contents of that docu-
ment involves exploitation of the knowledge gained by the response to the
subpoena. Possession seems to invoke concepts of access more than commu-
nication of information. However, if the focus is on the simple requirement
that the target's truthtelling is involved in production, then my earlier distinc-
tion may be ill founded. When the focus is on truthtelling, the same Fifth
Amendment violation should be found from a revelation of the location or
whereabouts of evidence through its production as from a revelation of
existence. Truthtelling would be an equally critical component of the govern-
ment's acquisition and exploitation of the evidence in either situation.
According to Fisher's analysis, an action of production proving location
is incriminating without a detailed examination of the contents of the docu-
208. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 19, 26-27 (discussing fact that production of subpoenaed
materials confirms existence of those materials).
209. See Doe 1, 465 U.S. 605, 613-14 n.12 (1984) (affirming district finding that produc-
tion of subpoenaed documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination). But cf id. at 617
n.17 (rejecting contention that all grants of use immunity cover both document contents and act
of production). The court of appeals in Hubbell concluded that acknowledging existence of two
sources of incriminating documents "provided a link in the chain of evidence used by the Inde-
pendent Counsel to substantiate the criminal charges against ... [Hubbell] - an instance of
indirect incrimination." United States v. Hubbell, 167 F3d 552, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd,
120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).
210. See United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037,2048 (2000) (concluding that testimo-
nial aspects of respondent's act of production precluded compelled production without prior
grant of immunity).
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ment or item produced when: (1) possession of the item itself is a crime (such
as with contraband); (2) current possession or access helps establish posses-
sion or access at an earlier relevant time (such as when the crime occurred
using the item); (3) possession helps to establish guilty knowledge, (4) pos-
session helps authenticate an item by circumstantially linking the item to its
possessor;2 and (5) lack of possession of items that should be in the target's
possession helps either to prove guilty knowledge or fraud. 12 I have argued
that, in the absence of one of these more direct uses of possession or location
to incriminate, the act of production should not be protected under the Fifth
Amendment and, therefore, should not require use immunity even if posses-
sion is not established as a "foregone conclusion." I reached this conclusion
largely for the practical reason that any other conclusion effectively would
undo Fisher. As I noted in an earlier Article:
[A]dmissionofpossessionthroughproductionis significantunderthefifih
amendment onlywhereithas incriminatingpotential apart from divulging
to the prosecution information aboutthepresent location ofthe incriminat-
ing item. If revealing the present location ofthe incriminating document
were sufficientto trigger thefifthaamendment, theprivilege would allowthe
witness to protect an item or document, absent a showing that its present
location was a "foregone conclusion," simply because its contents were
incriminating. Such a broad construction of the privilege would violate
Fisher'sholdingthat anitemis notprotected simplybecause its contents are
incriminating.
13
With Fisher badly damaged, if not obliterated, byHubbell, it is far from clear
whether my position remains viable that a distinction should exist between the
treatment of existence and possession for any purpose. Practical consider-
ations may support some distinction, but it lacks a clear theoretical basis.
The critical question is whether a specifically identified, facially innocu-
ous business or personal document (such as a diary) that is known to exist can
be subject to subpoena, regardless of its incriminating contents, because proof
of possession is not deemed incriminating. If the answer is yes, whether the
prosecutor knows the location of the documents becomes irrelevant. How-
ever, if contents routinely are considered when determining whether posses-
211. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 25 (isting different ways that possession of items may
prove to be incriminating irrespective of incriminating factual content of item).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding
that failure to produce documents, which would factually negate its existence, could not be used
to prove non-existence of certificate of deposit upon which fraud charge was based).
213. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 25-26 (examining apparent fundamental inconsistency
between considering incriminating quality of document when possession is at issue and general
refusal of Fisher to give incriminating documents protection under Fifth Amendment).
SUBPOENAS FOR INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE
sion is incriminating, establishing the whereabouts of the documents as a
"foregone conclusion" becomes theoretically critical, but practically difficult.
Hubbell certainly changes the atmosphere for resolving this critical question.
Earlier in this Article, I offered three hypotheses on how the incrimination
issue might be resolved. 4 Of these three possible solutions, the first was to
preserve Fisher's narrow construction of incrimination (i.e. incrimination is
determined without considering the contents of the documents for both posses-
sion and existence). This solution can no longer be supported. Although the
Court has not explained the error in Justice White's statement in Fisher,"' it
certainly has not followed that narrow construction of incrimination.
My two other hypotheses - that incriminating contents may be consid-
ered when existence is unknown to the authorities, but not when possession
(location) is the issue, and that incriminating contents may be considered when
the authorities lack knowledge of either the item's existence or its possession
(location) - remain viable after Hubbell. Indeed, I believe either of these two
results may fit a post-Hubbell analysis.
A majority ofthe Hubbell Court may have reached the simple but impor-
tant conclusion that the Fifth Amendment could not be read as narrowly as
Justice White's majority opinion in Fisher suggested, given that such a
reading inevitably undercuts essential anti-inquisitorial components of the
right against self-incrimination." 6 Alternatively, a dramatic change in analy-
sis from Fisher may be taking shape, but this change in the treatment of the
incriminating quality of possession may be the result of the entry of immunity
analysis into the mix, with its rigorous procedures for protecting against both
direct and indirect uses of immunized evidence. The court of appeals noted
the difference between the incrimination requirement when used to determine
whether the Fifth Amendment applies to production and the prohibition
against derivative or indirect use of evidence once the Fifth Amendment has
been found applicable." 7 Nevertheless, it examined the contents of the docu-
214. See supra Part m.C (describing major competing alternatives after Hubbell decision
for how courts should treat incriminating quality of documents in determining whether act of
production is incriminating).
215. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,412 (1976).
216. See supra Part V.B.1 (reciting hypotheticals posed, inter alia, by Supreme Court
justices, which suggest their unease with inquisitorial implications of government's position).
217. The court of appeals faulted the district court for inappropriately employing use im-
munity analysis concerning contents to determine whether the OIC violated Hubbell's privilege
against self-incrimination. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affd,
120 S. Ct 2037 (2000) (concluding that in considering lack of OIC knowledge of contents of
documents, as opposed to existence of such basic documents, "the district court improperly
conflated this Fisher/Doe I inquiry with the conceptually separate and temporally subsequent
Kastigar inquiry").
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ments under an "indirect incrimination" analysis to determine whether the act
of production incriminated under the Fifth Amendment.218 While the court of
appeals applied the indirect incrimination concept only to the issue of exis-
tence, it did not explain (and it is conceptually unclear) why it would not also
apply the indirect incrimination idea broadly to possession.
Finally, possession of incriminating documents maybe held to incriminate
as a result of a more sensitive factual construction undertaken in the aftermath
of Doe I and Hubbell rather than from some broad theoretical reformulation.
The court of appeals noted that possession of incriminating documents might
eliminate the defense of lack of knowledge." 9 If courts consider possession of
documents with incriminating contents incriminating simply because such
possession could help to refute a defense of lack of knowledge,"0 the incrimi-
nation requirement will turn, as a matter of fact, on an analysis of whether the
contents of a document are incriminating.
As discussed in earlier segments, the statements in Fisher about incrimi-
nation do not appear to contemplate any of these expansive methods of meet-
ing the incrimination requirement."1 Most likely, lower courts will finesse the
issue in the typical documents case, which involve large numbers of docu-
ments, with a range of possible theories of incrimination. They may embrace
a "fuzzy" analysis under which possession of some documents may incrimi-
nate and find that non-trivial, but uncertain possibility of incrimination
sufficient. When they deal with individual items, courts typically will consider
viscerally incriminating objects such as weapons. As a result, a clear resolu-
tion ofthe conceptual issue may not come quickly. The uncertainty should be
218. Id. at 582 (examining potential impact of production of materials demanded by sub-
poena).
219. Id.
220. Possession of documents would not appear meaningfully to support the ability of
many documents to incriminate individuals. For example, when a person wrote a document,
his or her subsequent possession only shows guilty knowledge or helps to refute an absence of
guilty knowledge argument otherwise shown by authorship. Such possession only adds trivially
to incrimination. On the other hand, possession does tend to show guilty knowledge or negate
a defense based on the absence of knowledge if the documents have incriminating contents and
were prepared by others. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13
1983 & June 33, 1983, 722 F.2d 981, 982-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that complying with
subpoena would incriminate by showing possession of documents by former corporate president
who was target of a fraud investigation involving company's reorganization and who no longer
had right to possess documents). However, Justice White's statement in Fisher about the
limited incrimination effect of possession either resulted from missing this insight or finding it
insufficient.
221. On the other hand, Doe implicitly may signal a different result In that case, the Court
adopted the lower courts' finding that testimonial incrimination existed apparently for possession
as well as existence. Doe , 465 U.S. 613-14 n.11 (1984).
542
SUBPOENAS FOR NCRIMflXATING EVIDENCE
resolved, however, if the item subpoenaed and produced is the target's per-
sonal diary that incriminates only through the information he or she wrote in
it. Whatever the theory, Fisher's cramped concept of incrimination at least
was altered substantially, if not obliterated, by the result and perhaps the
rhetoric used in Hubbell.'
On the other hand, perhaps a future Court will draw a distinction between
incrimination through informing the government that a document of a certain
character exists - even though the mere fact that it has such a general charac-
ter is not incriminating - and a target's admitting that it possesses a document
of that character. If so, the effect would be to treat most documents differ-
ently than tangible objects, such as weapons and contraband, which incrimi-
nate based on the general character of the item rather than through an exami-
nation of its specific contents. Whether there is a basis in Fifth Amendment
theory (as opposed to practicality) for such a distinction between existence
and possession is far less clear after Hubbell's gloss than before the case was
decided. However, it is undeniable that the text of the opinion did not rule on
this set of issues.
E. The Function of "Reasonable Particularity" Test or Its Equivalent as a
Mechanism for Implementing the "Foregone Conclusion" Principle
As discussed earlier, document production does not violate the Fifth
Amendment under Fisher if the information communicated is itselfa "foregone
conclusion." Furthermore, inHubbell, the court of appeals adopted the Second
Circuit's standard of "reasonable particularity" to implement the "foregone
conclusion" concept. 4 The court of appeals indicated that the "reasonable
222. Because the diary was seized through a search, Moyer v. Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d
580, 583-87 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (en bane) (holding that seizure of diary by law enforcement
officials does not violate privilege against self incrimination), does not present such a case. In
order to test the issue, a target likely will need to comply with the subpoena and deliver the evi-
dence to the prosecution in a situation where location is not a "foregone conclusion."
223. See supra Part IV.C (describing use of broad Fifth Amendment rhetoric and its im-
plications).
224. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1999) affd, 120 S. Ct.
2037 (2000). The D.C. Circuit adopted the standard articulated in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 1 F3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying "reasonable particularity" test and finding
it satisfied where defendant had provided copy of document to government agency). The
Second Circuit case, in turn, cited In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 616 F. Supp. 1159
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) for the proposition that production may not be refused "if the government can
demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows of the existence and location of subpoe-
naed documents." In re GrandJurySubpoena Duces Tecum, 616 F. Supp. at 1161. Neither the
Second Circuit case, nor the district court decision it quoted, gave a definition of "reasonable
particularity."
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particularity" standard would apply to knowledge of existence, possession,
and authenticity. However, it concluded that it was in no position to decide
whether OIC had satisfied that standard and remanded the case to the district
court for further factual development2 5
While the circuit court applied the "reasonable particularity" standard to
all three of the communicative acts, it applies best to proof of existence, which
was the court of appeals's key concern. 226 The appellate court highlighted two
factors. First, the court looked at the "quantum of information possessed by
the government before it issued the. . . subpoena!"2V and the "quantum of
information that the government seeks to extract through compelling the ex-
pression of the contents of the individual's mind."'  The gap between these
two levels of knowledge, with particular emphasis on the knowledge required
from the target, was central to the court's determination of whether the act of
production is communicative.2 9 Second, the court of appeals rejected the
OIC's attempt to establish its knowledge ofthe existence of Hubbell's records
by describing them in '"generalized terms of business, financial and tax re-
cords, "" while using his status as a consultant and a taxpayer to establishthat
he had such records.31 The court explained that there are no essential classes
or categories of records and that categories such as those proposed by the IOC
were highly capable of manipulation. 3
2
Part of what the circuit court was attempting to do with its "reasonable
particularity" standard was to translate the "foregone conclusion" concept into
a workable test for the world of documents, so that results, if not documents,
could be classed and categorized. Although the government must prove that
it knew of the existence of the documents themselves, the court of appeals
ruled, contrary to the district court's conclusion, that the government was not
required to establish that it knew of the information contained in the docu-
ments733 Thus, under this test the government must show that it knows that
a specific document or type of documents exists, but it need not know the
information contained in them.
225. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 585.
226. Id. at 578 n.33, 580, 582, 583 (focusing on existence separate from authenticity or
possession).
227. Id. at 569.
228. Id. at 575.
229. Id. at 576. I suggest that, regarding "foregone conclusion," the critical analysis is
instead on how much information the government possessed.
230. Id. at 578.
231. Id. at579.
232. Id. at 578-59.
233. Id. at 580.
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Although overstating its position somewhat, the OIC made a reasonable
point in its argument to the Supreme Court when it argued that requiring
"reasonable particularity" implicitly moved the determination in the direction
of requiring knowledge of contents of documents. The OIC argued:
Only by its contents - what it says, not its shape, size or texture - may a
document be described with any particularity, for it is those contents that
give the document significance. Thus, a standard requiring identification
of a document with reasonable particularity, is in effect, a standard that
demands advanced knowledge of the contents of the document.
Contraryto the OIC's claim, many documents can be described withparticular-
ity by their "cover" or container." Some documents, however, will defy such
description and, as the OIC argued, require a description of contents to avoid
a constitutionally unacceptable generic description. The "reasonable particu-
larity" terminology is designed to make manageable the conflict between
general categorization and requiring knowledge of the contents of specific
documents. The "reasonable particularity" test does not allow abstract treat-
ment. Instead, the government's specific knowledge that particular documents
in fact exist is subject to a context-based examination.
While the "reasonable particularity" terminology is helpful in handling
the issue of the government's knowledge of existence, it is far less useful for
the question of location or possession. When issues of place and time, rather
than categorization, are critical, the rubric of an information gap is of less use
than a focus on the specificity of the government's knowledge. However, the
common denominator in both situations is that detailed knowledge is required
rather than categories and generalization.
Although the Supreme Court in Hubbell did not endorse the "reasonable
particularity" test, it is the leading candidate for the proper standard given the
apparent overall consistency between the Court's approach in Hubbell and the
circuit court's more detailed treatment of the issues." 6 In this Article, I will
not attempt to develop an analysis of how courts apply or should apply the
"reasonable particularity" test in concrete cases. Neither the District of
Columbia nor the Second Circuit has developed an actual, working definition
for the term. 7 Attempting to develop a reasonable application of the concept
234. Brief for Petitioner OIC, supra note 42, at 36.
235. For example, a bank statement could be identified adequately by naming the bank that
provides it and the specific month in question, -without indication of items within that statement
236. SeeLAFAVEETAL, supra note 11, § 8.13(a), at262-63 & n.27 (stating intestthatlower
courts generally have adopted this standard, but noting in supporting footnote that "[v]arious
formulations have been offered as to how persuasive this demonstration of knowledge must be").
237. As noted earlier, see supra note 224, the courts in United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d
552, 579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000), In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
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is a daunting task that will require both fine grained factual analysis and con-
sistent, sophisticated categorization." Because the Supreme Court has not
only failed to endorse the "reasonable particularity" test, but also has failed
to provide real guidance on how to frame the proper test,239 I see little basis
on which to claim that whatever system I might develop should be accepted.
For these reasons, I do not attempt in this Article to analyze the test suggested
or to develop a different practical test for meeting the "foregone conclusion"
requirement.
F. Justice Thomas's Proposed Redefinition of the Fifth Amendment to
Prohibit Compelled Production ofEvidence
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, which Justice Scalia joined, is
worse for the prosecution than the implications of the majority's opinion for
the continued utility of immunity applied to targets. Justice Thomas suggested
that the Fifth Amendment, contrary to the holdings in the Court's act of pro-
duction cases, may prohibit not only compelling testimonial communications,
but also compelling the production of any evidence.24 Justice Thomas's
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment would provide the same protection to
a target responding to a subpoena duces tecum as a target responding to a
subpoena requiring testimony.24 Thus, even if the act of production did not
entail any communicative act, the government would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment if the evidence compelled had a tendency to incriminate. Granting use
immunity would put any such evidence off limits to the prosecution.
The government lost inHubbell at least in part because of its facts and the
posture in which the case was presented, and the government cannot expect
Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993), which Hubbell cites, and In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 616 F. Supp. 1159,1161 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), from which the Second Circuit took
the terminology, merely provided an indirect or conclusory definition of the standard.
238. Such categorization would prove extremely difficult, for as the circuit court in Hub-
bell stated, "there are no essential classes or categories of information." United States v. Hub-
bell, 167 F.3d 552,579 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affld, 120 S. Ct 2037 (2000).
239. United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 2047, 2048 (2000) (declining even to
suggest definition and only noting that "[w]hatever the scope," facts of case at hand clearly fell
outside it).
240. See id. at 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I remain open to a reconsideration of that
decision [Fisher] and its progeny in a proper case... in light of the historical evidence that the
Self-Incrimination Clause may have a broader reach than Fisher holds.").
241. Id. at 2050 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas was relying on historical research
suggesting that, at the time of the framing, the understanding ofthe term "witness" as used in the
Fifth Amendment included both the furnishing of testimony and evidence. Id. at 2050-51
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1603-23 (discussing historical con-
text surrounding development of FifthAmendment).
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much better results in the future. Unless Justices Thomas and Scalia change
their position, the prosecution no longer can count on two of the Court's most
conservative votes. Some of the most difficult hypothetical questions regard-
ing the dangerous implications of approving the Hubbell subpoena came from
Justice Scalia.2 42 Under the facts of Hubbell it was easy to argue that the
framers would not have intended the Fifth Amendment to allow prosecutors
to compel a target to provide evidence establishing guilt of unknown charges
while still being subject to prosecution. The framers did not intend the new
American system to have such an inquisitorial feel.243
VI. Conclusion: The Remnant of Fisher Remaining after Hubbell
The cowboys' wild ride, not only in the arena of Hubbell facts, but also
through assumed impregnable Fifth Amendment barriers under the courts'
hypotheticals, provoked a major reformulation of act of production doctrine. 2"
Under a tenable, but admittedly expansive, view of the consequences of this
rampage, the prosecution can continue to subpoena evidence from targets and
use that evidence against them only when a precise description of the items
subpoenaed eliminates the need for the target to select or identify items in the
category, when the prosecution clearly knows that the specific items de-
manded in the category exist, and when it knows their whereabouts at the time
the subpoena is served.24 For this to be a thorough reformulation, the analysis
of the incrimination issue must roughly parallel developments regarding testi-
monial communication, which means that incriminating contents can be con-
242. See Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 166, at 12, 22 (presenting OIC counsel's
statement referring to "Justice Scalia's gun hypothesis" and counsel for Department of Justice
responding to Justice Scalia's handgun hypothetical).
243. See supra note 12 (discussing Justice Frankfurter's statements that "[o]urs is an accus-
atorial and not an inquisitorial system").
244. See supra Parts IV-V (discussing ramifications of Hubbell decision).
245. This narrow ambit of effective operation for subpoenas directed to individuals may
be very close to the position that Justice Marshall envisioned in his concurring opinion in
Fisher, which reads like either a dissent or a proposal for reformulation. Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391,430-34 (Marshall, J., concurring injudgement). Marshall suggested that because
of the difficulty of establishing "present existence and possession of most private papers," and
because there is "a precise inverse relationship between the private nature of the document and
the permissibility of assuming its existence," private documents would remain almost as
unavailable to the prosecution after Fisher as they had been under Boyd. Iel at 432-33. After
Hubbell, Justice Marshall's view of the lasting impact of Fisher may be more accurate than
Justice White's articulation in the opinion for the majority.
Following the logic of Marshall's argument, a target's actions that successfully hide items
before the subpoena was served would defeat the subpoena. On the other hand, hiding or
destruction of evidence after the subpoena was served would remain subject to direct sanction
that is not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
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sidered when possession of the document is the issue. Whether courts should
so reformulate incrimination analysis is not at all clear. However, without
reformulation, the apparently minor issue - incrimination - may come to the
forefront as courts sift through the wreckage in an effort to salvage some way
to continue forcing targets to surrender pre-existing incriminating documents.
How protective the courts will prove to be when the issue is the target's
possession of an item rather than its existence and how incrimination analysis
will play out as to possession are the major puzzles remaining after Hubbell.
Resolution of these issues will likely be interconnected. The Court's conclu-
sions either will allow the anti-inquisitorial sentiment of Hubbell to invalidate
subpoenas demanding that targets produce evidence that could incriminate
them or will permit the Court to distinguish subpoenas for documents, where
production might continue in a limited fashion, from other more facially in-
criminating items of physical evidence, whose compelled surrender appeared
to greatly trouble the courts in Hubbell.
Any reconstruction of OIC's wreckage, however, must wait until another
day. The Court found it sufficient to re-establish in Hubbell that the funda-
mental components of Fifth Amendment doctrine apply to document produc-
tion.
NOTES

